Antitrust Treatment of Nonprofits: Should Hospitals Receive Special Care? by Capps, Cory et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Health Care Management Papers Wharton Faculty Research
2-2017
Antitrust Treatment of Nonprofits: Should
Hospitals Receive Special Care?
Cory Capps
Bates White LLC
Dennis W. Carlton
University of Chicago
Guy David
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Health and Medical Administration
Commons, Nonprofit Administration and Management Commons, and the Nonprofit
Organizations Law Commons
This is a working paper, not accepted for publication or review.
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers/12
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Capps, C., Carlton, D. W., & David, G. (2017). Antitrust Treatment of Nonprofits: Should Hospitals Receive Special Care?. National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w23131
Antitrust Treatment of Nonprofits: Should Hospitals Receive Special
Care?
Abstract
Nonprofit hospitals receive favorable tax treatment in exchange for providing socially beneficial activities.
Extending this rationale would suggest that, insofar as suppression of competition would allow nonprofits to
cross-subsidize care for needy populations, nonprofit hospital mergers should be evaluated differently than
mergers of for-profit hospitals. However, this rationale rests upon the premise that nonprofit hospitals with
greater market power provide more care to the needy. In this paper, we develop a theoretical model showing
that the welfare implications of an antitrust policy that favors nonprofit hospitals depends on the link between
market power and charity care provision. To test the link, we use three measures of charity care—two dollar-
denominated and one based on service volume—to study charity care provision by for-profit and non-profit
hospitals under different competition conditions. Using detailed California data from 2001 to 2011, we find
no evidence that nonprofit hospitals are more likely than for-profit hospitals to provide more charity care, or
to offer more unprofitable services, when competition falls. Overall, while some courts have given deference
to defendants’ nonprofit status, our study finds no empirical evidence that such hospitals provide greater
charity care as they have greater market power.
Disciplines
Antitrust and Trade Regulation | Health and Medical Administration | Nonprofit Administration and
Management | Nonprofit Organizations Law
Comments
This is a working paper, not accepted for publication or review.
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers/12
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF NONPROFITS:
SHOULD HOSPITALS RECEIVE SPECIAL CARE?
Cory Capps
Dennis W. Carlton
Guy David
Working Paper 23131
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23131
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
February 2017
We thank Bob Town, Marty Gaynor, Tomas Philipson, Mark Pauly and participants at the NBER 
Health Care Program  for helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft and to Samantha 
Burn and Karen Zhang for excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been 
peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies 
official NBER publications.
© 2017 by Cory Capps, Dennis W. Carlton, and Guy David. All rights reserved. Short sections of 
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full 
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
Antitrust Treatment of Nonprofits: Should Hospitals Receive Special Care?
Cory Capps, Dennis W. Carlton, and Guy David
NBER Working Paper No. 23131
February 2017
JEL No. I11,L22,L31
ABSTRACT
Nonprofit hospitals receive favorable tax treatment in exchange for providing socially beneficial 
activities. Extending this rationale would suggest that, insofar as suppression of competition 
would allow nonprofits to cross-subsidize care for needy populations, nonprofit hospital mergers 
should be evaluated differently than mergers of for-profit hospitals. However, this rationale rests 
upon the premise that nonprofit hospitals with greater market power provide more care to the 
needy.  In this paper, we develop a theoretical model showing that the welfare implications of an 
antitrust policy that favors nonprofit hospitals depends on the link between market power and 
charity care provision. To test the link, we use three measures of charity care—two dollar-
denominated and one based on service volume—to study charity care provision by for-profit and 
non-profit hospitals under different competition conditions. Using detailed California data from 
2001 to 2011, we find no evidence that nonprofit hospitals are more likely than for-profit 
hospitals to provide more charity care, or to offer more unprofitable services, when competition 
falls. Overall, while some courts have given deference to defendants’ nonprofit status, our study 
finds no empirical evidence that such hospitals provide greater charity care as they have greater 
market power.
Cory Capps
Bates White LLC.
1300 Eye Street, NW
Suite 600
Washington, DC 20005
cory.capps@bateswhite.com
Dennis W. Carlton
Booth School of Business 
University of Chicago
5807 S. Woodlawn Ave. 
Chicago, IL 60637
and NBER
dennis.carlton@chicagobooth.edu
Guy David
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
202 Colonial Penn Center
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6218
and NBER
gdavid2@wharton.upenn.edu
1 
 
I. Introduction 
Private nonprofit hospitals account for 58% of all short-term, non-federal, general hospitals, 
with private for-profit hospitals accounting for 21% and government hospitals for 21%1. 
Hospitals are designated as nonprofit if they do not distribute profits and are deemed to 
provide sufficient public benefits such as charity care. In exchange, nonprofit hospitals 
receive financial benefits, including exemptions from federal income taxes and state property 
taxes. In contrast, under the antitrust laws, nonprofit hospitals typically do not receive an 
analogous concession in recognition of their provision of public benefits, although some 
courts in older cases used nonprofit status as a basis for lenient antitrust treatment Most 
commonly, actions by nonprofit hospitals that would increase market power, such as 
mergers, joint ventures, collective price setting, or other conduct such as tie-in sales, are 
precluded because increased market power is presumed to harm consumers by elevating price 
and reducing output. But, if nonprofit hospitals use their profits to provide public benefits, 
should a nonprofit hospital be able to defend itself against an antitrust claim by arguing that 
any increased market power it achieves will enable it to increase its provision of public 
benefits, even if the prices to some patients rise? As noted, the tax laws do provide favorable 
treatment. Should the antitrust laws, or courts in antitrust cases, do the same?  
Putting aside the practically unlikely first-best solution of direct funding of care to the needy 
through lump sum taxes and focusing on second-best solutions, theory is ambiguous.2 For 
                                                 
1  American Hospital Association, Fast Fact on US Hospitals, January 2014.  
2  Under the Affordable Care Act, not all states expanded Medicaid and, even in those did, uninsurance rates remained at 
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example, Philipson and Posner (2009) develop a model in which nonprofits maximize a 
combination of profits and output. They show that a nonprofit with this objective function 
will set a lower price than would a for-profit firm. However, they also show that the price 
effects of an increase in market power will be greater for nonprofits. Based on this result, 
they argue against special antitrust consideration for nonprofits. In contrast to their findings, 
we present a model below in which, by relaxing the financing constraint, competition-
reducing mergers of nonprofits can increase total welfare by increasing the provision of 
charity care.  In this case, the antitrust laws should not necessarily condemn competition-
reducing mergers of nonprofit hospitals without an empirical examination.  
Overall, economic theory indicates that a balancing of social benefits against harm from 
market power may be appropriate under the assumption that nonprofits will provide greater 
social benefits when they have greater market power. In this paper, we go beyond theory and 
evaluate whether there is systematic empirical evidence that nonprofit hospitals do in fact 
increase their provision of uncompensated care to those without insurance—the main public 
benefit often claimed by nonprofits—in response to increased market power. Few papers in 
the empirical literature address this question generally and, to our knowledge, no paper 
studies the effect of changes in market power on the volume of uncompensated care rendered 
by nonprofit hospitals. This most closely related study is Garmon (2009), which examines 
the relationship between competition and the estimated dollar value of charity care provided.3 
                                                 
4% or higher. Kaiser Family Foundation, State Health Facts, “Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population: 
2015,” available at http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/. At present, uninsurance rates are unlikely to 
decline further and may increase.  
3    We discuss Garmon in more detail below; as we also show below, measuring the volume of uncompensated care 
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Using 11 years of detailed data on hospital competition and several measures of charity care, 
we find no empirical evidence that nonprofit hospitals increase charity care as they acquire 
greater ability to do so through increased market power. We confirm our baseline 
econometric results with a second, independent analysis of market power based on how the 
travel times of patients change in response to changes in market power. Hospitals in litigated 
merger cases have appealed to their nonprofit status as part of their defense, and with success 
in some cases.  Our results, however, show no significant difference in the propensities of 
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals to provide more charity care as they have greater market 
power.  That is, we find no empirical basis for courts in merger cases to treat nonprofit 
hospitals more favorably on the grounds that they may use their market power to provide 
greater charity care.  
We also find that, after controlling for their size, nonprofit hospitals provide only marginally 
more uncompensated care than do for-profit hospitals. This finding, together with our central 
result, is consistent with other studies of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals that have found 
little difference in how the two organizational forms respond to financial incentives. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to question the grounds for tax exemption, but our evidence 
suggests a potential role for enhanced administrative oversight of nonprofit hospitals.  
Moreover, we find that controlling for size, government-run hospitals, rather than nonprofit 
hospitals, provide a disproportionately high amount of uncompensated care.4 This result 
                                                 
directly can generate different results than measuring the volume of uncompensated care. 
4     However, beyond their compelling community orientation, non-federal government hospitals have been found 
to be less efficient compared to private ones (Douglas, Currie, and Simeonova 2010). 
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raises the important question of whether tax exemptions for nonprofit hospitals are a less 
efficient method of funding care for the poor than providing an equivalent amount of funding 
to government run hospitals. Indeed, multiple government entities have started examining 
whether the public benefits of specific nonprofit hospitals justify the tax benefits they receive 
and in some cases have rescinded the nonprofit status of the hospital.5  
This paper is organized as follows. In section II we provide background on the application of 
the antitrust laws to nonprofit firms such as hospitals and the justifications for nonprofit status. 
We also discuss the theoretical and empirical literature on differences in behavior between 
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. In section III we develop a theoretical model of the effects 
of competition on the behavior of nonprofit hospitals. We show that the provision of public 
benefits such as uncompensated care can indeed rise when nonprofit hospitals increase their 
market power and therefore, from the viewpoint of theory, it may be perfectly legitimate to 
allow nonprofits to argue that an increase in their market power would benefit society by 
increasing the provision of uncompensated care. In section IV, we test empirically the 
theoretical proposition that increased market power leads to an increase in public benefits using 
                                                 
5  For example, in 2010 the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that Provena Covenant Medical Center in Urbana, 
Illinois did not meet the requirements for tax exemption. The court noted that the hospital waived just 0.7% 
of its revenue, far less than the tax benefits it stood to receive. The court also cited Provena’s small charity 
pool: only 302 of the hospital’s 10,000 inpatient and 100,000 outpatient admissions involved charitable care 
(Sataline, 2010). Separately, Senator Grassley and colleagues have introduced federal legislation that would 
impose penalties on nonprofit hospitals that do not meet a minimum requirement for uncompensated care 
provision ("Grassley Targets Nonprofit Hospitals on Charity Care," Wall Street Journal, December 18, 2008). 
Controversy over the public benefits provided by nonprofit hospitals have continued even after the 
introduction of new community benefits reporting requirements under the Affordable Care Act. (Advisory 
Board, 2013; Doyle, 2014; Schencker, 2015).  
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data from California hospitals from 2001 to 2011 and find no evidence to support that theory. 
Section V concludes the paper. 
II. Background  
The rationale underlying nonprofit status is that such firms presumably provide some public 
benefits that for-profit firms would have little or no incentive to provide. Implicit in this 
rationale is the notion that financing such benefits through tax exemptions is either more 
efficient or more politically feasible than financing through direct subsidy. The provision of 
those benefits could depend on a suppression of competition. For example, two food 
organizations might agree to divide a city in half and serve separate halves in order to 
economize on resources rather than “compete” with each other to serve meals throughout the 
city. The antitrust laws would generally condemn such market allocation among for-profit 
firms as a violation of the antitrust laws that prohibit conspiracy.  
However, in several litigated cases, courts have allowed nonprofits to defend behavior that 
would otherwise violate the antitrust laws with the argument that the public benefits of the 
challenged behavior outweigh the adverse effects of lessened competition. For example, in 
the MIT case, the Department of Justice sued several universities because they entered an 
agreement to restrict competition for students through financial aid.6 Although the district 
court found the agreement a per se violation of the antitrust laws, the appellate court reversed 
the decision and ordered the district court to take explicit account of the claimed public 
                                                 
6  See Carlton et al. (1995) for an economic analysis of this case, U.S. v. Brown University, et al., 5F.3d 658 (3rd 
Cir. 1993) (Carlton served as an expert on behalf of MIT). 
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benefit of the collective action (spreading a given amount of aid among more rather than 
fewer poor students) as an offset to any harm from the collective agreement.7  
Nonprofit status has also been an issue in multiple hospital merger cases, with merging 
nonprofit hospitals consistently raising their status as a defense (Richman, 2007). Courts 
have varied in their receptiveness. The most extreme case was the merger of the two largest 
hospitals in Grand Rapids, Michigan, Butterworth Hospital and Blodgett Memorial Medical 
Center. There, the district court held that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had 
established its prima facie case that the merger would lessen competition. Nevertheless, 
relying on the hospitals’ nonprofit status, the court denied the FTC’s motion for an order to 
block the merger.8 In this case, the court’s logic differed from the rationale described in this 
paper: rather than balancing harm from market power against the value of community 
benefits (funded by that same market power), the court concluded that, because of its 
nonprofit status, the merged system would not raise prices in the first place, despite the 
presumed ability to do so. Similarly, in a case in Joplin, Missouri, the court cited the merging 
hospitals’ nonprofit status as one of several reasons why it rejected the FTC’s merger 
challenge.9 
                                                 
7  In antitrust parlance, a per se violation is one where the conduct is deemed so likely to reduce output that no 
analysis of the reasonableness of the conduct is allowed, while under a rule of reason a defendant is allowed 
to justify the reasonableness of his behavior through a comparison of costs and benefits. The antitrust issue 
for nonprofits is whether they are allowed to use a rule of reason defense and include expanded public benefits 
as part of the justification for their behavior. 
8  FTC v. Butterworth Health, 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996).  
9  FTC v. Freeman Hospital, 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995). The 
court in United States v. Carilion Health System articulated a similar view. 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 
1989), aff’d, 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table decision). 
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Thus, there are two possible rationales for more lenient antitrust treatment of nonprofit 
hospitals. The first, which courts have primarily focused on to date, is that nonprofit hospitals 
would not exercise any market power they might gain. The second is that they will do so, but 
in ways that are socially valuable—for example, use their enhanced market power to raise the 
level of uncompensated care. The first rationale has been studied and, with the exception of 
Lynk (1995), rejected. Studies have found that nonprofits do charge higher prices in more 
concentrated markets (Simpson and Shin 1998; Dranove and Ludwick 1999; Keeler et al. 
1999). Moreover, a number of case studies of nonprofit hospital mergers have found that 
nonprofit hospitals increase price when they gain market power through merger (Vita and 
Sacher, 2001; Krishnan, 2001; Haas-Wilson and Garmon, 2011; Thompson, 2011; Tenn, 
2011).10 
As for the second rationale, the economic literature has not made comparable progress in 
addressing whether and how the provision of public benefits changes as a result of increased 
market power – the focus of this paper.11 After all, the public benefits have to be paid for 
somehow, and as we discuss next, higher prices to some patients is a potential mechanism to 
                                                 
10  Each study finds evidence of post-merger price increases; however, for the merger studied in Thompson 
(2011), prices went up for two insurers, down for a third, and remained about the same for the fourth.  
11  Tax exemptions and financing through tax exempt bonds for nonprofits are (or used to be) justified by a 
“bargain” that was “struck between the hospital and the community: a hospital would treat patients who were 
unable to pay, and the government would grant a tax exemption to the hospital” (Pellegrini, 1989). Originally 
the IRS code defined charity as “relief to the poor,” but, after the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid, with 
the bulk of hospital revenue coming from private insurance and public programs, the hospital industry pushed 
the IRS to revise its definition of “charitable services” (Seaton and Koob, 2009). Under current federal 
requirements, nonprofit hospitals are expected to provide “community benefits” in return for their 501(c)(3) 
tax-exempt status. While the definition of “community benefits” is broader (Nicholson et. al., 2000), the 
provision of charity care in the form of free or reduced price services remains at the heart of the justification 
for nonprofit hospital tax exemptions. 
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finance them. Although the effects of competition on nonprofit hospitals’ provision of charity 
care have not been closely studied, some literature examines whether nonprofit hospitals 
differ in their behavior from for-profit hospitals and specifically with regard to the provision 
of “community benefits” (e.g. Duggan, 2000, 2002). This literature generally shows that 
nonprofits and for-profits respond similarly to financial incentives and, in at least one case, 
do not differ in how they spend incremental funds on charity care.12 If there is in fact no 
difference in the provision of public benefits, the entire rationale for special tax treatment for 
nonprofits is suspect. There is also evidence that hospitals rely on cross-subsidies for the 
provision of unprofitable services (David et al., 2014). However, the studies in this literature 
typically do not control for the competitive environment and therefore do not look at whether 
any differential behavior towards the provision of charity care between nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals depends on market power.13 
We have found only one study that empirically examines the effect of hospital competition 
on the provision of public benefits by nonprofit hospitals, Garmon (2009). Using data from 
Texas and Florida for 1999–2002, Garmon analyzes the effects of changes in competition on 
the dollar value of charity, measured as a hospital’s cost-to-charge ratio times the sum of its 
charity care and bad debt. Garmon also examines the effect of changes in competition on 
hospitals’ average revenue from uninsured patients. He concludes that competition and 
                                                 
12  Sloan (2001) finds that nonprofits and for-profits provide a similar quality of care but that for-profits cost 
Medicare more, ceteris paribus. Because Medicare prices are regulated, this suggests that for-profit hospitals 
order more costly procedures for paying patients than nonprofit hospitals. 
13  For example, Stensland, Gaumer, and Miller (2010) find that hospitals that face less competition and have 
greater private payer revenue tend to have higher costs, which can create a misleading impression that 
private payer profits subsidize unprofitable care provided to government-insured patients.  
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charity care are “if anything, positively related.” That is, Garmon finds no evidence in 
support of more favorable antitrust treatment for nonprofit hospitals.  
Our study explores a more direct, volume-based measure of inpatient uncompensated care 
that is unlikely to be affected by differences in accounting practices across hospitals. As we 
demonstrate, dollar-denominated measures of charity or uncompensated care have been 
subject to rapid list price inflation and may be a poor representation of hospitals’ ability to 
translate their surplus into provision of unprofitable services. We also examine whether 
nonprofit hospitals expend their rents in a socially beneficial way by maintaining 
unprofitable service lines, a practice that benefits all patients, not just charity care patients. 
Finally, we examine 11 years of data, allowing us to capture greater variability and leverage 
changes in hospitals’ market power and ownership status. This in turn allows us to rely on 
the panel aspects of our data as opposed to relying primarily on cross-sectional variation.   
III. Models of nonprofit objectives and constraints  
Philipson and Posner (2009), develop a theory in which altruistic nonprofit producers exhibit 
some degree of “output preferences;” that is, they derive utility directly from output in 
addition to profits. They recognize the difference between a nonprofit’s utility and the utility 
in the absence of altruism, but show that, nevertheless, competition still maximizes society’s 
surplus. Based on that model, Philipson and Posner recommend an antitrust doctrine that 
does not distinguish between for-profit and nonprofit actors. We show that their result 
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vanishes when nonprofits have a slightly more general objective function than the one 
postulated in their paper. 
The key insight that Philipson and Posner identify is that if an altruist has an output 
preference, then competition among altruists, just like competition among profit-maximizing 
firms, will generate the “correct” marginal pricing conditions, but only if the social welfare 
function values consumption in the same way as the altruist. For example, if  represents the 
additional value that the altruist attaches to everyone’s incremental health consumption, then 
p = c -  is the optimal pricing condition, where p is the price and c is marginal cost. But for 
this pricing condition to represent optimality, it must also be the case that such marginal 
pricing will lead to financial viability for the firm. However, even in the simplest constant 
returns to scale model, this cannot be true unless the altruist has funding sufficient to 
subsidize the consumption of the poor (a “rich altruist”), as Philipson and Posner assume. 
Conversely, if funds must come from the revenue of the nonprofit firm rather than from the 
rich altruist, then it must be the case that the financing constraint will matter.14 Therefore, the 
ability to exercise market power is critical ingredient the ability to provide uncompensated 
care, an ingredient completely missing from the Philipson and Posner analysis. 
In addition, the altruist in the Philipson and Posner model values the incremental health care 
consumption of all consumers at . A slight modification is to allow the altruist to value the 
health care consumption of different individuals differently. For illustration, suppose that the 
altruist thinks that rich people can afford a minimal level of health care consumption, but 
                                                 
14  In essence, we do not allow the altruist to levy lump sum taxes on the public. 
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poor people cannot. Hence, the altruist values additional health care consumption (beyond 
the minimum) of rich people at zero and that of poor people (who are below the minimum) at 
.15 These two changes to the Philipson and Posner model—incorporating a financing 
constraint and allowing the altruist to differentially value the health consumption of the rich 
and the poor—can completely reverse their conclusion.  
Our point is not that our assumptions are necessarily superior to theirs but rather that their 
strong theoretical conclusion does not survive even minor changes to their model’s 
assumptions. Given the sensitivity of the theoretical conclusions to the assumptions, only an 
empirical analysis can resolve the issue of the proper role of nonprofit status in antitrust 
analysis. 
Two implications follow from our modifications. First, if the financing constraint matters (as 
would be the case if the altruist is not the sole source of funds), then the creation of market 
power through merger, through collective action such as coordinated price setting, or through 
conduct such as tie in sales may benefit society because the elimination of competition 
relaxes the financing constraint. Second, in order for market power to be exercised so as to 
generate funds to subsidize uncompensated care, the nonprofit firm must be able to charge 
differential prices to the rich and the poor.16 Without this ability, the transfer from the rich to 
the poor could not occur. But competition makes such price discrimination difficult: with 
                                                 
15  By and large, the need to access charity care is discrete (patients either have insurance or they do not). Our 
assumption can easily be relaxed and our results continue to apply as long as the altruist places a higher 
marginal value on health care consumption by the poor than the rich.  
16  While many of the uninsured are not poor, for simplicity, we use the terms “rich” and “poor” to denote the 
patients that are paying above competitive rates and the patients who are benefitting from cross-subsidization. 
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differential pricing, hospitals (even nonprofits) will want to poach their rivals’ profitable 
customers and this erodes the ability to exercise market power. Hence, competition-reducing 
mergers can allow the merged firm to use its extra profits to subsidize the provision of public 
benefits, such as uncompensated care. We now briefly describe the model and refer the 
reader to Appendix A for a fuller discussion.  
Suppose the altruist values additional health consumption of the poor, q2, at , and that the 
cost function of a hospital that provides q1 care to the rich and q2 to the poor is given by 
c(q1,q2) = F + c·(q1 + q2) where c is the marginal cost of health care and F is a fixed cost. 
Assuming for simplicity that there are two hospitals owned by altruists, Bertrand competition 
will produce the equilibrium p1 = c – α and p2 = c. But this equilibrium produces losses for 
each firm and so is not sustainable unless each altruist has a pool of wealth that it can use to 
subsidize health care. If we abandon the Philipson-Posner assumption that the altruist can 
finance losses with lump sum transfers, then profits must be nonnegative, and we see that 
Bertrand competition with two firms is not possible. Competition prevents the firms from 
earning enough money to subsidize care for the poor.17  
Suppose now that the two firms merge or form a cartel and thereby eliminate competition. 
Since the firm is still altruistic, it follows that it can use its market power to raise price above 
c for the rich and thereby afford to lower the price below c for the poor. In fact, if the altruist 
                                                 
17  With less vigorous forms of competition, such as Cournot, charity care may be provided but not in the optimal 
amount. See Appendix A. 
  
13 
 
seeks to maximize consumer surplus (reflecting the altruist’s extra marginal valuation of 
health consumption by the poor) then the altruist will choose p1 and p2 to maximize 
(1)  
The solution to the social planner’s problem in (1) is a (modified) Ramsey pricing solution: 
 ,  ,  
where , λ is the Lagrange multiplier related to zero profits, and εi is the elasticity 
of demand for group i. Notice how the social planner pays attention not only to the “net 
mark-up” to the poor (i.e. the amount by which p2 exceeds c – α), but also to the markup on 
rich individuals (i.e. the amount by which p1 exceeds c). This solution clearly shows that the 
solution to the social planner’s problem cannot be achieved by Bertrand competition between 
two firms even when the altruist’s preferences are the same as those of the social planner. 
One could use other competitive mechanisms in place of Bertrand but the point would be the 
same. When market power is needed to provide funds to finance care for the poor, 
competition can be incompatible with the social optimum.  
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IV. Empirical analysis of uncompensated care, nonprofit status, 
and market power 
As noted above, some degree of market power is a necessary condition for the uninsured to 
receive care when nonprofit hospitals face a financing constraint.18 In general, the link 
between market power and uncompensated care will depend on the nonprofit hospital’s 
objective function. While it is entirely possible that nonprofit hospitals will direct profits 
from insured patients towards care for the uninsured, other possibilities, such as opportunistic 
behavior by nonprofit administrators, the dissipation of rents through possibly inefficient 
non-price competition, and various forms of regulatory evasion, are also plausible. 
Accordingly, whether and to what extent nonprofit hospitals with market power use profits 
from the insured to subsidize care for the uninsured is an empirical question.  
We use an 11-year panel of data on California hospitals from 2001 through 2011 to study 
changes in charity care provision by nonprofit, for-profit, and government hospitals as the 
market concentration and competition they face varies. The analysis data set combines 
financial information, including revenue, profit, and two dollar measures of uncompensated 
care provision, from the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development 
(OSHPD) Hospital Financial Disclosure Reports with concentration measures derived from 
the OSHPD Patient Discharge databases. We also use hospital discharge data to construct to 
                                                 
18  In practice, of course, nonprofit hospitals do receive various forms of subsidies, including in the form of tax 
exemptions. Nevertheless, the point remains that, greater market power can, depending on their objective 
functions, allow nonprofit hospitals to provide greater amounts of uncompensated care.  
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directly measure uncompensated care based on the volume of inpatient care provided to 
uninsured patients. 
IV.A. Measuring uncompensated care  
Both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals provide substantial amounts of uncompensated care 
(CBO, 2006). Uncompensated care is the most prominent form of reported community 
benefit; other categories include medical education and training, research, and community 
programs.19 Uncompensated care accounts for 56% of total community benefits reported by 
nonprofit hospitals, and the average and median percentages of revenue devoted to 
uncompensated care were 7% and 4% (IRS, 2009). These measures, however, are subject to 
manipulation; for example, the IRS study finds a great deal of variation in how hospitals 
measure and report uncompensated care.20  
In California, for-profit hospitals accounted for more than 20% of all uncompensated care. 
Like their nonprofit counterparts, for-profit hospitals are legally required to treat patients 
who require immediate medical attention, regardless of their ability to pay, and also may treat 
                                                 
19  Education and training account for 23% of reported community benefits, medical research accounts for 15%, 
and community programs account for 6% (IRS, 2009). Young et al. (2015) provide a more recent examination 
of community benefits provided by nonprofit hospitals. They report that about 85% of community benefit 
expenditures are related to direct patient care (25% for charity care, 15% for subsidized health services, and 
45% for unreimbursed costs under non-Medicare government programs). 
20  The IRS study reports that roughly one-fifth of hospitals include as uncompensated care each of the following: 
“the difference between hospital charges and the amount private insurance paid or allowed for services 
(private insurance shortfalls); the difference between hospital charges and the amount Medicare paid or 
allowed for services (Medicare shortfalls); the difference between hospital charges and the amount Medicaid 
allowed for services (Medicaid shortfalls); and the difference between hospital charges and the amount other 
public insurance programs allowed for services (other public program shortfalls).” Some of these measures 
appear suspect. For example, including “private insurance shortfalls” in uncompensated care is subject to 
ready manipulation: a hospital could increase its list charges, offer managed care organizations 
correspondingly larger discounts, and thereby report higher levels of uncompensated care.  
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patients who subsequently turn out either to lack insurance or to fail to pay the out-of-pocket 
portion of their medical bill. When the hospital approves in advance free or discounted care, 
such care is considered charity care, and will likely appear in a hospital’s financial data as a 
deduction from revenue under the category of “charity care.” In many cases, a hospital may 
learn after the fact that the care it provided was partially or entirely uncompensated. This is 
also accounted for as a deduction from revenue (similar to the accounting treatment of 
contractual discounts), but is commonly allocated to “bad debt.”21 In practice, the majority of 
uncompensated care in California is reported as bad debt rather than as charity care. 
Generally, hospitals and hospital systems vary in how they allocate uncompensated care into 
charity care and bad debt. As a result, uncompensated care, defined as the sum of charity care 
and bad debt, is likely the more reliable dollar-denominated measure of community benefits 
(CBO, 2006; David and Helmchen, 2006; Garmon, 2009). In the analysis below, we focus 
both on reported charity care and uncompensated care (defined as charity care + bad debt), 
but place more focus on the sum. 
The value of uncompensated care reported in hospitals’ financial statements may overstate 
both its market value and its cost. Some hospitals compute charity care and bad debt using 
the list prices for services as reflected in their chargemasters, which are lengthy menus of 
somewhat arbitrary list prices (Reinhardt, 2006; IRS, 2009). However, in practice, hospitals 
rarely if ever receive payment equal to their list charges. Private insurers commonly negotiate 
discounts under which actual payments may be 40-60% of list prices. Medicare payments are 
                                                 
21  See, for example, the discussion in Missouri Foundation for Health (2005).  
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typically below private rates, and Medicaid rates are usually lower still. The uninsured are 
often billed full list charges, but they rarely actually pay those bills, which will be reflected in 
high levels of bad debt.  
This method of valuation is likely to lead to biased estimates of charity care provision when 
inflation of and discounting from list charges are not constant across hospitals. For example, 
hospitals that provide the same volume of free care but have higher list charges may appear 
to provide more uncompensated care than hospitals with lower list charges provide.22 Cross-
sectionally, the bias would be particularly severe if hospitals with more market power have a 
greater ability or propensity to inflate their list charges. Such tendencies, to the extent that 
they are time-invariant, are diminished by the inclusion of hospital fixed-effects in the 
econometric analysis. Nevertheless, the concern remains that the within-hospital co-
movement of charity volume and list charges is responsive to the dynamics of competition. 
For example, hospitals in markets experiencing consolidation may use their market power to 
raise list and transaction prices without allocating more resources to enhancing the volume 
and type of uncompensated care provided. 
To avoid these issues and focus on actual services rendered to the poor, we construct a third 
measure of charity care: the volume of inpatient services provided to uninsured patients. 
Each year, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) computes and publishes 
DRG “weights.” From 2001 to 2011, the set of inpatient services hospitals offer were divided 
into roughly 550 Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). CMS determines weights for each DRG 
                                                 
22  Garmon (2009) accounts for this by deflating list charges by each hospital’s cost-to-charge ratio. 
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based upon regular surveys of hospitals’ costs. The weights reflect the relative cost of 
treating patients in a particular DRG. For example, a patient in a DRG with a weight of 4 is 
four times as costly on average to treat as a patient in a DRG with a weight of 1. The volume 
based measure of care provided to various sets of patients that we analyzed below (e.g., 
Medicare, Medicaid, privately insured, uninsured, etc.) is computed as the sum of the DRG 
weights for all patients in a given payer class.  
In summary, the three measures we examine are (1) “charity care”—the reported dollars of 
charity care; (2) “uncompensated care”—the sum of reported dollars of charity care and 
uncompensated care; and (3) “charity volume”—total inpatient services volume provided to 
patients without insurance. The first two span all services offered by hospitals, including 
outpatient and inpatient, but are subject to the limitations described above. The third is more 
accurately measured and is our preferred measure, though it only captures inpatient care.  
In 2008, CMS introduced changes to its DRG system to account for severity (Medicare 
Severity-DRG, or MS-DRG) that resulted in a complete restructuring of the taxonomy, 
including an expansion from 538 DRGs to 745 MS-DRGs. The change from DRG to MS-
DRG “weights” has little effect on our charity care provision analysis because those 
“weights” are aggregated yearly by payer category.  
 
Figure 2 presents histograms for the three charity measures. Since, all else equal, larger 
hospitals are expected to provide higher nominal and actual rates of charity care, measures of 
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charity are divided by the number of staffed beds for each hospital. Charity measures, 
adjusted for size, appear to follow a log normal distribution. 
Figure 3 presents statewide yearly trends in total charity care, bad debt, and charity volume. 
Both charity care and bad debt (and thus, the sum of charity care and bad debt) more than 
tripled between 2001 and 2011. Charity volume, on the other hand, grew by just half over the 
same period.23 This suggests that the growth in charity care and uncompensated care is 
driven by increases in both charges and patient volume, but more so the former.24  
IV.B. Measuring competition 
We use a measure of competition that does not require specifying any geographic market or 
market boundaries (this measure is similar to that used in Kessler and McClellan (2000)).25 
Our competition measure is constructed as follows. In the first step, we calculate the standard 
HHI based on observed shares of commercially-insured patients within each unique zip code 
and Major Diagnostic Category (MDC) combination (a “micromarket”), taking joint 
                                                 
23  Over this same period, the under-65 population of California grew by 8.9%, from 31.2 million to 33.0 million; 
the size of that group that is uninsured rose slightly to approximately 6.9 million 
(http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/historic/hihistt6.xls). The increase in measured charity volume 
exceeds the growth in the uninsured population.  
24  Nonprofits cannot distribute their profits. However, if profits from excess pricing are dissipated through higher 
compensation and staff perquisites, a hospital’s costs will increase and so will its cost-to-charge ratio. Even 
holding the actual volume of uncompensated care fixed, this could misleadingly increase the dollar-
denominated value of uncompensated care. Another factor that could drive greater increases in the dollar-
denominated measures is that, over time, more services have shifted to the outpatient setting and the charity 
volume measure only reflects inpatient services. This is unlikely to account for a significant portion of the 
widening gap because statewide inpatient discharges increased steadily over the sample period.  
25  Imposing arbitrary market definitions, such as counties, health service areas (HSAs), or metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSAs), may overstate or understate the true size of the market and generate spurious conclusions about 
the degree of competition faced by specific hospitals, or produce a measure of concentration that has so much 
measurement error that it would be challenging to identify any relationship between concentration, market 
power, and charity care. 
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ownership into account.26 All hospitals that treat patients in a given MDC-zip code pair are 
part of this HHI calculation, so we do not impose any market boundaries (except insofar as 
we use data only from the State of California). In the second step, we compute a hospital-
specific HHI for each hospital as the weighted sum of micromarket HHIs, where the weight 
is the share of that hospital's patients that originate from each zip code-MDC combination.27  
In general, hospitals that draw patients from more concentrated zip codes and more 
concentrated service lines will have higher hospital-level HHIs. The higher a hospital’s HHI, 
the weaker is the competitive pressure that it faces. Therefore, not surprisingly, a number of 
studies have demonstrated that this modified HHI is a good predictor of hospital prices, 
supporting its use to measure hospitals’ and systems’ market power (Gruber, 1994; Keeler, 
Melnick, and Zwanzinger, 1999; Dranove and Ludwick, 1999; Capps and Dranove 2004).28 
                                                 
26  Because we focus on acute care hospitals, for the purpose of measuring competition, we exclude MDCs 19 
(psychiatric care) and 20 (alcohol and drug related admissions), which are also provided by standalone 
psychiatric hospitals and addiction treatment centers, respectively. Additionally, these services are used 
disproportionately by the uninsured population and are considered unprofitable; therefore, they are not likely 
to contribute to or reflect the formation of market power. In order to avoid double-counting labor and delivery 
admissions, we also exclude DRG 391, the DRG for a normal newborn.  
27  Our data for the three measures end in 2011 because the five-digit zip codes needed to match demographic 
information to corresponding MDC-zip combination are available from California OSHPD only before 
2011. In this paper, we only present results that use hospital-specific HHI calculated without hospitals of 
Kaiser Permanente. The exclusion of Kaiser hospitals is because Kaiser hospitals compete only indirectly 
with the hospitals we study (Ho and Lee (2013)), whereas our hospital-specific HHIs intend to capture the 
levels of direct hospital competition. For robustness check, we conduct a set of analysis using hospital-
specific HHI calculated with Kaiser hospitals. Our main results are robust to the inclusion of Kaiser. 
28  Kessler and McClellan (2000) noted, correctly, that this competition measure is likely endogenous and 
proposed constructing the hospital-level HHIs using the predicted values from a discrete choice model that 
includes only exogenous right hand side variables (rather than observed market shares) to compute the HHI 
in each micromarket. In practice, estimating 11 years of logit models for the state of California is impractical 
and, as we show below, the simpler measure based on observed micromarket shares is an effective predictor 
of hospital pricing.  
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Formally, the measure of the degree of competition faced by hospital j, Hosp-HHIj, is defined 
as follows:  
(2)  
 is the typical HHI, computed as the sum of squared market shares among patients 
from zip code z with a diagnosis in MDC m.  
Using this measure of competition addresses the problems raised by pre-specifying a 
geographic market within which to measure competition. However, the Hosp-HHI may still 
be subject to endogeneity (e.g., hospitals’ prices determine their market share and thus the 
HHI, and prices may also affect the provision of charity care). Kessler and McClellan address 
this issue by substituting for the observed shares within each microsegment the predicted 
shares from a choice model that uses only exogenous factors (e.g., distance and age) as 
predictors. This approach is less practical in the current setting because, while Kessler and 
McClellan compute their concentration measures for heart attack admissions only, we study 
all acute care inpatient admissions.29  
We view the concern as minimal. Due to the presence of insurance, the majority of the 
hospital population faces no variation or very modest variation in prices across in-network 
hospitals (the same is true of the uninsured, who typically do not pay their inpatient hospital 
                                                 
29  Compared to the data in Kessler and McClellan, our data encompass roughly 20 times as many patients per 
year and span 11 years rather than four.  
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bills). As a result, market shares and HHIs will be affected by prices only to the extent that 
variation of such prices in our data determine whether hospitals are included in or excluded 
from insurers’ networks. 
This distinction was discussed in detail in Vistnes (2000), who described hospital 
competition as a “two stage” process. In the first stage, hospitals and insurers negotiate 
pricing and determine network structure. In the second stage, hospitals compete for patients 
primarily on the basis of non-price factors. Most hospitals have at least some excess capacity 
and would find it profitable at the margin to enter agreements with as many insurers as 
possible. This explains why, in practice, most managed care networks, at least until recently, 
include most hospitals.30 Price, therefore, serves primarily to divide the gains from trade 
between hospitals and insurers (and insurers’ customers). The direct effect of price on 
patients’ choices among in-network hospitals is minimal, so we do not think endogeneity 
poses a problem in this context. We also explore a sensitivity analysis that replaces the all-
patient hospital-HHIs with the hospital-HHIs derived from just enrollees in traditional 
Medicare. The hospitalization decisions of Medicare enrollees are unlikely to be affected by 
network restrictions (virtually all hospitals accept Medicare), pricing, or market power 
(Medicare prices are regulated). 
                                                 
30  This was less true in the 1990s, when HMOs were both more common than PPOs and tended to feature 
narrower networks. By the end of the 1990s, consumers had largely rejected narrow networks, and HMOs 
began offering broader networks (which PPOs had always offered). See Draper et al. (2002) and Ginsberg 
(2005). The appendix in Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) contains a stylized proof showing that 
insurers have an incentive to assemble expansive hospitals networks. Narrower networks have become 
somewhat more common in recent years, but that trend was in the very early stages as of 2011, the final year 
of our data.  
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IV.C. Data overview 
Table 1 presents summary statistics describing the time path of the number of hospitals, beds, 
utilization, financial information, and charity care provision from 2001–2011, separately for 
nonprofit, for-profit, and government hospitals. Over the sample period, the number of 
nonprofit hospitals declined by 7.5% and the number of for-profit hospitals declined by 
14.6%. The bulk of this decline occurred after 2003 and was likely related to requirements 
that hospitals complete seismic retrofitting by 2006 (some hospitals closed or converted to 
other uses rather than retrofit; Chang and Jacobson, 2008). Average net income among for-
profit hospitals also began a marked decline in 2004. Average net income among nonprofit 
hospitals, however, increased steadily over the sample period. With the economic recovery 
following the 2008 financial crisis and recession, however, net income for hospitals of all 
types had improved by 2011.31   
Average discharges at the surviving hospitals increased over time, as expected given 
population growth and hospital closures. The average number of beds increased only slightly 
between 2001-2011 since exiting hospitals were smaller than average, and then evened out or 
declined. Consequently, growth in discharges per hospital was primarily the result of higher 
utilization of existing beds rather than the addition of new beds.32 
                                                 
31  California also began Medicaid expansion under a federal waiver in November, 2010, which may have 
contributed to improved net income in 2011 (Harbage and King, 2012). 
32  The average exiting hospital had 101.6 beds while the average surviving hospital (i.e. hospitals appearing in 
every year of our sample) had 194.2 beds. 
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The middle three rows in each panel contain the annual averages of the three measures of 
charity care: reported charity care, uncompensated care (charity care plus bad debt), and the 
volume measure of charity care.33 At nonprofit hospitals, all three measures grew rapidly 
over the sample period. Notably, as indicated in Figure 3, the volume-based measure of 
charity care grew at a much slower rate than either of the two dollar-based measures of 
charity care. This suggests that some portion of the increase in measured charity care reflects 
factors other than increasing levels of uncompensated inpatient care. As discussed above, this 
could result from increases in list charges, decreases in reimbursement for some types of 
insured patients, or accounting practices that incorporate expenditures not directly related to 
patient care, such as medical research and teaching, into the reported charity care measures. 
Government hospitals reported growing levels of charity care and bad debt, but did not 
provide an increasing volume of inpatient care to the uninsured and indigent (as we show 
below, however, the level of inpatient care that government hospitals provide to the 
uninsured was high relative to their scale and revenue and remained so).  
Figure 4 charts average trends by ownership type for each of the three measures of charity 
provision. The left panel reports raw means while the right hand-side panel tracks measures 
of intensity by dividing each charity measure by the number of staffed beds and averaging it 
across hospitals within ownership type. Nonprofits saw a sharp increase in all three charity 
measures over the 2001–2011 period. For-profit hospitals did as well, but the increase was 
                                                 
33  The patient discharge data contain 10 different payer categories. This measured is constructed as the sum of 
DRG case weights provided to patients for whom the expected payer is either “County Indigent Programs,” 
“Other Indigent”, or “Self Pay.” 
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smaller, particularly for the dollar-denominated measures. On a per bed basis, increases in 
charity care and uncompensated care are similar for all three categories of hospitals. The 
pattern is different for the volume-based measure. Government hospitals did not increase 
charity volume, either on an overall or per bed basis. But they consistently provided a much 
higher level of charity volume than for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. The average nonprofit 
hospital provided more charity volume than the average for-profit hospital, but the bulk of 
this difference is attributable to the larger average size of nonprofit hospitals—the per bed 
charity volume measures are much more similar for the two types of hospitals than the per 
hospital volume measures.  
Summary statistics for scale measures, concentration, and the three charity measures are 
presented in Table 2. Three Hospital-HHI measures are also summarized: the first is derived 
from the full sample of patients, the second is based only on privately insured patients, and 
the third is calculated based only on Medicare patients. Our primary analysis relies on the 
first measure; the sensitivity analysis presented below discusses reasons for considering these 
alternative measures and establishes that our results are robust to alternative ways of 
measuring concentration.  
The final column in Table 2 shows that over the full sample period, nonprofit hospitals 
actually account for a disproportionately low share of total charity care provision, particularly 
when that care is measured by volume rather than dollars. Despite accounting for 65% of 
beds, 67% of discharges, and 71% of revenue, nonprofit hospitals account for only 64% of 
charity care and bad debt and only 55% of the total volume of inpatient service provided to 
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the uninsured. Perhaps surprisingly, for-profit hospitals actually account for a 
disproportionately large amount of charity care measured in dollars, though the same is not 
true for the volume measure. Relative to their overall scale, government hospitals provide a 
particularly large volume of inpatient care to the uninsured—almost one-third of the total 
volume of care provided to the uninsured is provided by government hospitals.34 They 
account for 34% of charity volume even though they account for only 16% of patient beds, 
15% of discharges, and 15% of patient revenue. 
As suggested by the theoretical section above, the disproportionately low level of charity care 
provided by nonprofit hospitals could be the result of competitive pressures that preclude 
charging prices to insured patients that are sufficiently high to facilitate cross-subsidizing 
uncompensated care. However, Table 2 also shows that nonprofit hospitals on average face 
less competition than for-profit hospitals. Moreover, while the degree of competition faced 
by for-profit hospitals has increased slightly over time (the average hospital-HHI for for-
profits fell from 3,123 in 2001 to 2,939 in 2011), the degree of competition faced by 
nonprofit hospitals remained roughly unchanged over the sample period. 
IV.D. Results 
The basic regression model posits that charity care measure m is a function of the degree of 
competition faced by a hospital and of other potential control variables Wj,t such as patient 
                                                 
34  Consistent with this evidence that government hospitals are more focused on providing care to the needy, 
CBO (2006) reports that, for government hospitals, uncompensated care accounts for 13% of operating 
expenses, as compared to 4.7 percent at nonprofit hospitals and 4.2 percent at for-profit hospitals. 
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mix (e.g., uninsured patients living near a given hospital) or local demographics (e.g., 
income, urban/rural area): 
 
  
 
The first term, , is a constant that is specific to each ownership type and  is a set of 
hospital fixed effects. The coefficient on the measure of market power, , captures the 
extent to which hospitals with more market power provide more (or less) charity care. To 
identify potentially differing propensities to provide more charity care for a given level of 
market power, we allow the coefficient on the concentration measure to vary according to the 
ownership type of hospital j. That is, .35 
The test of whether, relative to for-profit hospitals, nonprofit hospitals provide more charity 
care as they face less competition reduces to a test of whether . That will be our key 
test for whether the antitrust laws should provide special consideration to nonprofit hospitals. 
In addition, our specification allows us to test whether, all else equal, nonprofits provide 
more charity care than for-profits. This is a test for whether the tax exemptions enjoyed by 
nonprofit hospitals are justified by their provision of uncompensated care. This amounts to a 
test of whether 36 
                                                 
35  1[.] is the indicator function, which equals 1 if the argument is true;  is defined analogously  
to . 
36  Strictly speaking, the special case where FP< 0 and FP<0, would indicate that, on average, nonprofit hospitals 
provide less uncompensated care than other hospital types but, also on average, provide more uncompensated 
( )
, ( ) ( ) , ,( ) _ .
m
j t Type j j Type j j t j t t jtLn Charity Hospital HHI W D         
( )Type j j
( )Type j
( ) *1[ 1] *1[ 1]       Type j NFP FP j Govt jFP Govt
0 FP
0.FP 
( )Type j
( )Type j
  
28 
 
We explore two sets of models in the baseline analysis. The first is a set of cross-sectional 
and fixed effect models, presented in Table 3, which are robust to correlations between 
unobserved time-invariant hospital-specific factors and the error term. However, to the extent 
that the provision of charity care is related to time-invariant (or largely so) hospital 
characteristics (e.g., teaching status, scale, unobservable factors) or factors that are not 
available on an annual basis (e.g., income of the surrounding area), fixed effects regressions 
cannot identify potentially important determinants of the provision of charity care. We also 
perform a set of cross-sectional regressions that include a wider set of hospital and area 
characteristics (presented in Table 4). Robust standard errors are used in all analyses to 
account for heteroscedasticity. In addition, in fixed effect models, we cluster the standard 
errors at the Hospital Referral Region (HRR) level to account for potential correlated 
standard errors within HRRs.37 
The hospital characteristics included in the full controls specifications include ownership 
type, teaching status, discharges, and an indicator for rural hospitals. Area characteristics are 
computed at the hospital service area (HSA) level and include the median income in each 
HSA, the 18-65 population, total population, the poverty rate, and the percentages of 
hospitalized residents that lack insurance and that have private insurance.38 The variables 
                                                 
care when their market power increases. This case is more nuanced, as it support differential treatment under 
the tax code and the antitrust law. Here, we find no evidence that FP< 0, so the average level of uncompensated 
care provision by nonprofits and for-profits is examined solely by focusing on the sign of FP. 
37  HRRs represent regional health care markets for tertiary medical care that generally requires the services of a 
major referral center. Using this level of aggregation reduces the number of clusters and is therefore would 
make inference more conservative.  
38  HSAs are defined by the Dartmouth Atlas Project and are computed as collections of zip codes “whose 
residents receive most of their hospitalizations from the hospitals in that area.” See 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/faq/data.shtm. For demographic data from the Census, HSA averages are 
  
29 
 
describing the payer mix within each HSA are derived from the hospital discharge data and 
so vary over time; accordingly, these are included in both sets of models.  
Our cross-sectional results are presented in the upper panel of Table 3.39 In the model without 
ownership interactions, the coefficient estimates on hospital-HHI are positive and statistically 
significant for all charity measures, indicating that each rises with concentration. Adding 
ownership interactions reveals our key finding, namely that there is no statistically significant 
positive difference between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in terms of the relationship 
between concentration and charity care, uncompensated care, or charity volume. (top panel 
of Table 3, row 2.) If anything, for-profit hospitals on average provide more uncompensated 
care than nonprofit hospitals as they face less competition (this is evident only for the dollar-
denominated uncompensated care measure). Government hospitals provide less charity 
volume in more concentrated markets, but higher levels of charity and uncompensated care. 
Especially since charity volume is our preferred measure of charity care, the lower provision 
of charity volume by government hospitals when concentration increases is a surprising 
finding that we leave for future research. 
When hospital fixed-effects are included (lower panel of Table 3) the statistical significance 
of the baseline relationship between the two dollar-denominated measures of charity care and 
concentration disappears. Charity volume is not higher in more concentrated markets in all 
specifications. Importantly, just as before, there is no evidence that the positive effect of 
                                                 
calculated as population-weighted averages of the zip code level means. There are 215 HSAs in California 
that contain hospitals.  
39 The cross-sectional results are robust to clustering at HRR level. 
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market power is greater for nonprofit hospitals than for for-profit hospitals on the provision 
of charity. (bottom panel of Table 3, row 2—none of the coefficients are negative and 
significant). Overall, the results in Table 3 show no empirical support for the proposition that 
nonprofit hospitals use greater market power to provide greater public benefits. Thus, we find 
no evidence to support special treatment for nonprofit hospitals under the antitrust laws. 
An intermediate case between the upper and lower panels of Table 3 is presented in Table 4, 
where instead of including hospital fixed effects, the regression is saturated with hospital-
level and market-level characteristics.40 As in the less saturated cross-sectional specifications, 
there is a statistically significant positive relationship between concentration and charity 
volume. But there is, again, no statistically significant difference in the effect of 
concentration on the provision of charity care between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals (see 
the second row in Table 4).41, 42  
In terms of the level of charity volume, when compared to nonprofit hospitals and controlling 
for size and market concentration, for-profit hospitals provide lower charity volume on 
average, though the difference is not statistically significant.43 This finding calls into question 
                                                 
40  In Table 4, column (7)-(9), we regress the three charity care measures using full specification but exclude 
rural hospital from the sample. Rural hospitals usually have high HHIs, but not necessarily high bargaining 
leverage because insurers don't have a strong incentive to sell in the more rural areas. We exclude those rural 
high HHI data points and find our results reported below are the same as using full sample.  
41  As in Table 3, Table 4 shows that government hospitals’ charity volume is either less sensitive to or negatively 
related to the degree of competition faced by the hospital. That is, government hospitals appear to provide less 
charity care in more concentrated markets. This is a surprising result that we leave for future research. 
42  As in the upper panel of Table 3, results in Table 4 are robust to clustering HRR level. 
43  The difference is statistically significant in one specification for uncompensated care, which is the sum of 
charity care and bad debt. This indicates that the provision of uncompensated care rises with concentration 
more for the for-profit hospitals than the nonprofits. As we note above, dollar measures of charity care will 
be inflated by higher list prices and also depend on idiosyncrasies in hospital's accounting practices. 
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the special treatment that nonprofit hospitals receive under the tax code. Government 
hospitals provide substantially higher charity volume (columns (3) (6) and (9) in row 5 of 
Table 4) than both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals and the differences are statistically 
significant, even though they report lower levels of charity care and uncompensated care on 
average.  
Other coefficients have reasonable signs. For example, the results in Table 4 show that 
teaching hospitals provide statistically significantly more charity volume than nonteaching 
hospitals. Rural hospitals have higher levels of charity and uncompensated care (after 
controlling for size), but provide less charity volume.44 Charity volume rises as median 
income falls and as the percent uninsured rises. These findings all seem reasonable to us and 
give us confidence in our results. 
As highlighted in the theoretical model, the first step in a cross-subsidization mechanism is 
price increases to individuals with private insurance. To evaluate this mechanism, and as a 
basic check of the reasonableness of the market power measure, we replace our dependent 
variable from Table 4 with price measures. We analyze two price measures of what insured 
individuals are charged: (1) an overall severity-adjusted price and (2) a price index based on 
conditions (DRGs) treated at a broad set of hospitals. The results are presented in Table 5. 
                                                 
44  As expected, larger hospitals have higher levels of uncompensated care and charity volume but, as evidenced 
by the coefficient on the log of total discharges being close to 1, the effect is roughly proportional to scale. 
The coefficient on discharges is very close to 1 based for the charity volume measure and is further above 1 
for the other two measures.  
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We find that our concentration measure (Hosp-HHI) is positively related to prices, and the 
relationship is robust when hospital fixed effects are included.45  
IV.E. Provision of unprofitable services 
Nonprofit hospitals could use their profits to provide services that are unprofitable, even if 
those services are not disproportionately provided to uninsured patients. As noted above, 
hospital services commonly cited as unprofitable include psychiatric care, rehabilitation, the 
emergency department, trauma services, burn care, and labor and delivery (McClellan, 1997; 
Horwitz and Nichols, 2009; Lindrooth et al., 2010). Offer rates for these services by 
ownership type are presented in Table 6. It is clear from this table that nonprofit and 
government hospitals are the most common providers of these services. However, as shown 
in the pattern of results from probit models relating the probability of a hospital offering each 
of these services to concentration and ownership type (see Table 7), nonprofits are no more 
likely to offer these services as concentration increases than are for-profit hospitals. These 
services are generally more likely to be provided by hospitals in more concentrated markets, 
but this is not confined to nonprofit hospitals. And, for two services—trauma care and burn 
care—the effect of concentration on the probability of providing these unprofitable or less 
profitable services is stronger for for-profit hospitals and the effect is statistically significant.  
                                                 
45  For details on the construction of the price indexes, see Appendix C in online appendix. 
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IV.F. Sensitivity analyses 
One potential concern is that the measure of competition, the Hosp-HHI, may be 
endogenous. Kessler and McClellan (2000) noted, correctly, that this competition measure is 
likely endogenous and proposed constructing the hospital-level HHIs using the predicted 
values from a discrete choice model that includes only exogenous right hand side variables 
(rather than observed market shares) to compute the HHI in each micromarket. As noted 
above, this is impractical in the current analysis. As an alternative approach, we construct a 
version of the Hosp-HHI that is based solely on patients covered by Traditional Medicare 
(i.e., Fee-for-service Medicare). Medicare patients have essentially unfettered choice of 
hospitals and, because Medicare pays rates that are set administratively, Medicare patients 
also face little if any price variation across hospitals. Therefore, hospitals’ shares among 
Medicare patients are very unlikely to be affected by hospital market power or pricing.46 As 
shown in Appendix B1-B3. The results under this alternative measure of concentration are 
very similar to those under the baseline concentration measure.47 
                                                 
46  However, hospitals’ shares of Medicare patents in certain microsegments (e.g., obstetrics) is an imperfect 
proxy for the preferences of privately insured patients.  
47  Potential omitted variables, such as unobserved hospital quality, raise concerns with regard to obtaining 
unbiased estimates of FP. If patients can observe changes in quality (even to a limited extent), hospitals with 
increasing quality are likely to attract more insured and uninsured patients, resulting in both greater market 
share and more uncompensated care. Therefore, not controlling for hospital quality could result in a bias 
towards finding a positive relationship between market power and uncompensated care, even when using 
hospital fixed effects. Similarly, consolidation that results in fewer hospitals would lead to an increase in the 
number of uninsured patients seen by all hospitals, especially those patients that require emergency care. This 
somewhat mechanical effect would again suggest finding a positive correlation between market concentration 
and uncompensated care. However, we find little or no evidence of such an effect. Moreover, since we are 
interested in whether the relationship varies by type of ownership, it is not obvious that our estimate of such 
variation would be biased even if quality is endogenous. 
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We also considered the possibility that some service lines may be intrinsically unprofitable 
and also highly concentrated, in which case the apparent “concentration” may in fact be the 
provision of a community benefit. As a first note, our analysis focuses on acute inpatient care 
and so our concentration measure excludes two services, psychiatric care and rehabilitation, 
often cited as unprofitable.48 The acute care service lines most often cited as unprofitable 
include trauma care, burn care, the emergency department, neonatology, and, to a lesser 
extent, labor and delivery.49 Even among these services, however, privately insured patients 
are likely to be profitable. To explore whether we may be conflating concentration in 
unprofitable service lines with market power, we also estimate versions of the same models 
using the Hosp-HHI as constructed only from privately insured patients. The results are very 
similar to those under the baseline concentration measure and the Medicare-derived 
measure.50 (We revisit unprofitable services below.)  
Finally, we also considered the possibility that the results are driven primarily by cross-
sectional variation rather than within-hospital variation over time. To address this, we 
estimate the model using only hospitals that are in the bottom and top 25% of the distribution 
of changes in the Hosp-HHI from the beginning to the end of the sample.51 As shown in 
Table 8, the results under this restricted sample support our previous finding that nonprofit 
                                                 
48  See McClellan (1997), Horwitz and Nichols (2009), and Lindrooth et al. (2010). 
49  Note that visits to the emergency department (ED) are not recorded as inpatient care; only an ED patient who 
stays overnight would, typically, be admitted to the hospital and treated as an inpatient admission. 
50  These tables are omitted but are available upon request. 
51  25% of hospitals had a decrease in the Hosp-HHI of 237 or more and 25% of hospitals had an increase in the 
HHI of more than 108. The former would correspond to a firm with a share of roughly 22% splitting into two 
firms; the latter would correspond to a merger of two firms with shares of roughly 7% each.  
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hospitals do not provide statistically significantly more charity care, uncompensated care, or 
charity volume (relative to for-profit hospitals) as they face less competition. One distinction 
is that, based on the “large HHI change” restricted sample, concentration is negatively and 
significantly related to uncompensated care, whereas there is no significant relationship in 
the full sample analysis. This suggests that the estimated insignificant relationship reported 
earlier between concentration and uncompensated care in the full sample is primarily driven 
by cross-sectional rather than time series variation. Although, on the other hand, the 
relationship between concentration and charity volume stays positive and significant under 
all specifications in both the full and restricted samples, we are skeptical that increases in 
concentration will generally result in greater provision of charity care for either nonprofit or 
for-profit hospitals given the mixed results across different charity care provision measures. 
Moreover, there is no evidence, in these or prior specifications, that charity care provision by 
nonprofit hospitals is more responsive to reductions in competition than provision by for-
profit hospitals.  
As a final, distinct check of our basic result that nonprofits do not increase charity volume as 
they face less competition, we examine changes in the travel patterns of insured and 
uninsured patients to hospitals that were in the top 25% of changes in the hospital-HHI. For 
these hospitals, the average travel time of privately insured patients increased by roughly 
16% from 2001 to 2007 (from about 20.5 minutes in 2001 to 24 minutes in 2007). This 
indicates that hospitals that gained market power drew insured patients from a broader area 
(as opposed to business stealing from nearby rivals). However, there was no corresponding 
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increase in the average travel time of uninsured patients, which remained at 23.5 minutes.52 
That increased market power does not lead to a hospital drawing uninsured patients from a 
broader area suggests that there is a relatively fixed volume of uninsured patients that 
hospitals tend to accept, irrespective of their market power. 
V. Conclusion 
Our theoretical model suggests that the welfare implications of less competition among 
nonprofit hospitals will depend on the link between market power and the provision of 
uncompensated care. In particular, we show that cross-subsidization facilitated by market 
power may, theoretically, increase welfare. If the underlying premise that nonprofit hospitals 
use profits from private paying patients to fund care for the uninsured were borne out 
empirically, that could indicate a fundamental inconsistency between the tax laws, which 
offer nonprofits favorable treatment in exchange for community benefits, and the antitrust 
laws, which do not generally provide favorable treatment in recognition of community 
benefits.53  
Our analysis of 2001–2011 data on competition, ownership status, and charity care provision 
by California hospitals offers no support for according any special antitrust treatment to 
nonprofit hospitals. We find no evidence that nonprofit hospitals are more likely than for-
                                                 
52  Similar findings emerge when looking at the upper tail of the travel time distribution. For example the 90th 
percentile of travel time increased by 27% (from 41.2 to 52.3 minutes) for privately insured patients and by 
less than 2% for the uninsured (from 48 to 48.9 minutes). 
53  As noted above, some courts have credited merging hospitals’ nonprofit status, but on the expectation that a 
nonprofit would not raise price in the first place rather than on the expectation that the nonprofit would raise 
price and use the resulting profits to provide care to the uninsured.  
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profit hospitals to provide more charity care in response to an increase in market power. We 
also test whether nonprofit hospitals facing less competition are more likely to offer 
unprofitable services and again find no significant differences between nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals. Our results therefore provide no empirical justification for applying a 
different antitrust standard to nonprofit hospitals than to for-profit hospitals.  
Our results also allow us to test whether nonprofit hospitals provide more charity care than 
for-profit hospitals, adjusting for the level of competition. We find no empirical support for 
this proposition either. Examining the efficacy of the nonprofit tax exemption at promoting 
charity care is beyond the scope of this paper, but our evidence suggests a potential role for 
enhanced administrative oversight of nonprofit hospitals.  
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Figure 1: Graphical analysis of cross-subsidization: Bertrand duopoly versus monopoly  
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Figure 2: Histograms of Charity Measures (per number of staffed beds) 
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Figure 3: Growth of Charity Care, Bad Debt, and Charity Volume: 2001-2011 
 
	
Note:	left	scale	applies	to	charity	care	and	bad	debt;	right	scale	applies	to	charity	volume.		
	
	 	
Figure 4: Average Hospital Trends for the Three Measures: 2001 – 2011 
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Figure 5: Hospital Service Areas (HSAs) in California 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table 1: Summary data for California hospitals by ownership type and year, 2001-2011 
  
Control Variable 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
0
N 188 181 185 179 174 174 173 172             169             171             168             
Beds - staffed 215 219 217 220 224 218 221 219             216             217             211             
Discharges 10,245 10,316 10,639 11,022 11,435 11,390 11,500 11,654         11,729         11,790         11,782         
Gross IP Rev ($1000s) $264,565 $312,905 $372,221 $434,502 $498,698 $546,589 $599,348 $657,398 $724,332 $773,276 $825,586
Net income ($1000s) $5,486 $7,493 $7,696 $8,662 $11,374 $16,016 $19,765 $11,023 $12,885 $21,398 $26,990
Charity ($1000s) $4,124 $4,520 $5,650 $7,365 $9,335 $11,713 $13,617 $15,875 $18,879 $21,849 $24,219
Charity + Bad debt ($1000s) $10,662 $12,239 $14,548 $18,232 $20,963 $24,468 $26,899 $28,940 $33,727 $37,834 $41,601
Charity: Volume measure 431 462 517 575 626 647 681 699             725             760             809             
Hospital-HHI: Full sample 4,173 4,258 4,239 4,212 4,232 4,256 4,260 4,269          4,318          4,281          4,262          
Hospital-HHI: Private 4,278 4,298 4,260 4,203 4,187 4,220 4,222 4,225          4,279          4,260          4,252          
Hospital-HHI: Medicare 4,936 4,994 5,048 5,035 5,055 5,055 5,053 5,046          5,095          5,016          4,988          
N 89 88 87 83 76 78 77 74               78               75               76               
Beds - staffed 138 134 144 141 134 135 133 128             127             126             123             
Discharges 6,211 6,339 6,718 6,485 6,720 7,012 6,985 6,950           7,121           6,981           6,961           
Gross IP Rev ($1000s) $215,432 $255,041 $323,748 $314,930 $333,097 $351,082 $366,044 $376,114 $398,558 $409,808 $430,973
Net income ($1000s) $7,271 $7,339 $8,947 ($923) $1,851 $935 $450 $3,082 $6,284 $8,105 $8,694
Charity ($1000s) $5,145 $4,622 $6,460 $6,134 $6,069 $6,459 $8,042 $7,662 $9,319 $10,003 $9,270
Charity + Bad debt ($1000s) $9,713 $9,151 $12,608 $14,763 $12,516 $13,074 $17,223 $18,311 $22,020 $21,228 $21,790
Charity: Volume measure 229 227 257 245 242 250 268 316             337             377             415             
Hospital-HHI: Full sample 3,123 3,102 3,151 3,101 3,031 2,981 2,993 2,898          2,935          2,934          2,939          
Hospital-HHI: Private 3,129 3,095 3,127 3,168 3,039 2,969 3,028 2,954          2,937          2,949          2,945          
Hospital-HHI: Medicare 3,694 3,626 3,700 3,644 3,561 3,538 3,561 3,465          3,528          3,521          3,565          
N 62 64 65 63 64 63 64 62 62 60 61
Beds - staffed 151 148 149 155 156 154 153 155             154             149             144             
Discharges 6,941 6,754 6,780 7,042 7,160 7,356 7,275 7,273           7,001           7,254           6,932           
Gross IP Rev ($1000s) $141,456 $158,195 $176,217 $197,188 $215,932 $235,677 $246,953 $265,940 $282,339 $309,668 $323,240
Net income ($1000s) $21,163 $19,871 $20,977 $22,035 $26,554 $3,991 $4,629 $2,236 $1,712 $752 $15,404
Charity ($1000s) $3,711 $3,953 $3,963 $4,378 $5,739 $7,546 $10,607 $12,653 $13,466 $17,463 $17,074
Charity + Bad debt ($1000s) $9,077 $8,796 $9,245 $10,499 $16,395 $19,261 $20,951 $24,066 $26,184 $32,385 $33,957
Charity: Volume measure 1,135 1,069 1025 1,075 1,088 1,100 1,052 1,060           1,026           1,096           1,106           
Hospital-HHI: Full sample 4,289 4,204 4,200 4,179 4,121 4,133 4,071 4,095          4,259          4,128          4,237          
Hospital-HHI: Private 4,407 4,278 4,281 4,273 4,296 4,209 4,155 4,242          4,368          4,426          4,316          
Hospital-HHI: Medicare 5,032 4,881 4,888 4,964 4,852 4,848 4,782 4,821          5,012          4,869          4,903          
100 104.69 108.91 113.67 118.48 123.24 128.69 133.45 137.72 142.4 146.68Medical care CPI (2001 = 100)
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Table 2: Scale and charity provision by ownership type, full sample period 
	
	
Control Variable Mean S.D. Min Max % of Total
Beds - staffed 218 160 10 931 65.49%
Discharges 11,209 8,128 24 50,600 66.69%
Net patient rev. ($1000s) $211,350 $238,280 $1,810 $2,174,905 71.09%
Charity $12,255 $20,686  $       -   $232,742 65.44%
Charity + Bad debt $24,234 $30,157  $       -   $311,465 63.68%
Charity: Volume measure 626 815           -   6,322 54.94%
Hospital-HHI: Full Sample 4,250 1,530 1,630 8,633 59.73%
Hospital-HHI: Private 4,244 1,418 1,857 10,000 59.39%
Hospital-HHI: Medicare 5,029 1,616 1,701 9,189 59.71%
Beds - staffed 133 86 2 434 18.25%
Discharges 6,755 4,627 154 22,689 18.31%
Net patient rev. ($1000s) $90,809 $79,536 $2,896 $489,343 13.91%
Charity $7,115 $12,459  $       -   $104,170 17.31%
Charity + Bad debt $15,448 $18,785 ($3,260) $178,236 18.49%
Charity: Volume measure 285 316           -   1,897 11.39%
Hospital-HHI: Full Sample 3,022 1,185 1,240 7,913 19.35%
Hospital-HHI: Private 3,036 1,097 778 8,140 19.24%
Hospital-HHI: Medicare 3,586 1,234 1,670 8,803 19.51%
Beds - staffed 152 144 8 737 16.26%
Discharges 7,069 8,286 24 44,559 15.00%
Net patient rev. ($1000s) $125,011 $167,322 $2,490 $994,627 15.00%
Charity $9,053 $28,475  $       -   $284,893 17.25%
Charity + Bad debt $19,017 $40,399  $       -   $302,435 17.83%
Charity: Volume measure 1,075 2,065           -   17,172 33.66%
Hospital-HHI: Full Sample 4,174 1,219 1,618 8,561 20.93%
Hospital-HHI: Private 4,294 1,405 1,689 10,000 21.37%
Hospital-HHI: Medicare 4,895 1,323 1,717 9,192 20.79%
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Table 3: Cross-sectional and fixed effects results, log-log specifications 
	
 
	
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Charity Care Uncomp. Care Charity Volume Charity Care Uncomp. Care Charity Volume Charity Care Uncomp. Care Charity Volume
0.872*** 0.264*** 0.316*** 0.456*** 0.0755 0.480*** 0.473*** 0.158*** 0.635***
(0.116) (0.0497) (0.0394) (0.114) (0.0520) (0.0483) (0.121) (0.0562) (0.0487)
-0.210 0.324*** 0.0129 -0.214 0.280** -0.0442
(0.291) (0.124) (0.101) (0.294) (0.126) (0.0977)
3.176*** 0.693*** -1.130*** 3.153*** 0.599*** -1.328***
(0.473) (0.201) (0.105) (0.478) (0.207) (0.102)
3,505 3,502 3,505 3,505 3,502 3,505 3,505 3,502 3,505
0.429 0.604 0.708 0.446 0.607 0.716 0.446 0.609 0.728
0.568 0.216 0.440 0.469 0.209 0.420 0.506 0.211 0.304
(0.607) (0.235) (0.298) (0.617) (0.232) (0.302) (0.638) (0.236) (0.230)
0.0649* -0.0125 0.0214 0.0631* -0.0128 0.0261
(0.0378) (0.00848) (0.0168) (0.0368) (0.00811) (0.0194)
0.0978 0.0249 0.0110 0.0993 0.0253 0.00780
(0.121) (0.0338) (0.0189) (0.121) (0.0340) (0.0157)
3,505 3,502 3,505 3,505 3,502 3,505 3,505 3,502 3,505
0.793 0.840 0.928 0.793 0.840 0.928 0.793 0.840 0.934
Observations
R-squared
[A] Specification also includes year dummies, For-profit and Government hospital dummies, Ln(Total Discharges)
[B] Specification also includes year dummies, For-profit and Government hospital dummies, Ln(Total Discharges), HSA % Privately insured, HSA % Self-pay
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Errors in the hospital fixed-effect models are clustered on HRR
Ln(Hosp-HHI) *Government
Ln(Hosp-HHI)
Ln(Hosp-HHI) * For-Profit
R-squared
Hospital Fixed-Effects
Ln(Hosp-HHI) *Government
Observations
Ln(Hosp-HHI) * For-Profit
Cross-Sectional
Ln(Hosp-HHI)
No ownership interactions[A] Ownership interactions [A] Payer mix controls [B]
Table 4: Full covariates results, log-log specification 
 
	 	
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Charity care Uncomp. care Charity volume Charity care Uncomp. care Charity volume Charity care Uncomp. care Charity volume
Ln (Hosp-HHI) 0.261** 0.0751 0.628*** 0.160 0.0120 0.453*** 0.387*** 0.162** 0.527***
(0.132) (0.0578) (0.0517) (0.226) (0.0987) (0.0801) (0.145) (0.0633) (0.0607)
Ln (Hosp-HHI) x For-profit -0.320 0.234* -0.0780 -0.451 0.231* 0.0511 -0.380 0.164 -0.00378
(0.295) (0.126) (0.0990) (0.319) (0.123) (0.110) (0.323) (0.113) (0.115)
Ln (Hosp-HHI) x Government 3.125*** 0.610*** -1.158*** 3.159*** 0.750*** -1.156*** 8.015*** 2.223*** -1.724***
(0.466) (0.192) (0.0974) (0.559) (0.223) (0.115) (0.673) (0.312) (0.155)
For-profit 2.207 -1.904* 0.517 3.256 -1.859* -0.545 2.938 -1.216 -0.117
(2.382) (1.016) (0.812) (2.576) (0.994) (0.895) (2.607) (0.917) (0.934)
Government -27.53*** -5.353*** 10.07*** -27.84*** -6.527*** 10.13*** -68.60*** -18.85*** 15.00***
(3.937) (1.623) (0.819) (4.690) (1.872) (0.965) (5.617) (2.619) (1.299)
Teaching hospital -0.0329 0.0875 0.623*** -0.251 0.0124 0.604*** 0.711*** 0.279*** 0.514***
(0.191) (0.114) (0.0649) (0.192) (0.120) (0.0655) (0.177) (0.104) (0.0729)
Ln (Total discharges) 1.494*** 1.028*** 1.074*** 1.516*** 1.012*** 1.083*** 1.743*** 1.179*** 1.026***
(0.0560) (0.0295) (0.0217) (0.0583) (0.0342) (0.0245) (0.0623) (0.0380) (0.0295)
Rural hospital 0.636*** 0.231*** -0.207*** 0.797*** 0.242*** -0.240***
(0.138) (0.0605) (0.0437) (0.144) (0.0630) (0.0458)
Ln (HSA population) -0.106** -0.0528** -0.0734*** -0.208*** -0.0841*** -0.0659*** -0.227*** -0.102*** -0.0822***
(0.0483) (0.0215) (0.0171) (0.0513) (0.0227) (0.0176) (0.0523) (0.0229) (0.0209)
HSA: Median income -0.372** -0.212*** -0.190*** -0.748*** -0.386*** -0.208*** -0.255 -0.173** -0.166***
(0.157) (0.0655) (0.0552) (0.184) (0.0877) (0.0597) (0.165) (0.0696) (0.0605)
HSA: % Uninsured 1.640 7.719*** 13.73*** 6.367 8.402*** 17.85*** 9.767** 9.100*** 15.52***
(3.568) (1.861) (1.259) (3.931) (1.904) (1.447) (4.505) (2.539) (1.771)
HSA: % Privately insured 1.472** 1.043*** 0.407* 0.955 0.720*** 0.428* 1.207* 0.755*** 0.493**
(0.601) (0.228) (0.208) (0.632) (0.246) (0.226) (0.630) (0.236) (0.243)
year: 2002 0.00847 0.0858 0.0360 0.00414 0.0830 0.0364 -0.0326 0.0585 0.0419
(0.188) (0.0762) (0.0624) (0.186) (0.0755) (0.0600) (0.212) (0.0873) (0.0722)
year: 2003 0.265 0.239*** 0.0690 0.251 0.229*** 0.0671 0.239 0.195** 0.0524
(0.186) (0.0788) (0.0645) (0.184) (0.0775) (0.0626) (0.208) (0.0918) (0.0752)
year: 2004 0.526*** 0.415*** 0.0723 0.515*** 0.408*** 0.0646 0.432** 0.382*** 0.0529
(0.188) (0.0801) (0.0672) (0.185) (0.0796) (0.0652) (0.211) (0.0931) (0.0793)
year: 2005 0.857*** 0.527*** 0.121* 0.837*** 0.518*** 0.109* 0.727*** 0.488*** 0.111
(0.184) (0.0724) (0.0640) (0.181) (0.0714) (0.0626) (0.205) (0.0825) (0.0747)
year: 2006 1.177*** 0.653*** 0.185*** 1.160*** 0.649*** 0.172*** 1.052*** 0.610*** 0.178**
(0.179) (0.0729) (0.0619) (0.176) (0.0714) (0.0602) (0.200) (0.0794) (0.0720)
year: 2007 1.453*** 0.771*** 0.204*** 1.432*** 0.766*** 0.186*** 1.276*** 0.715*** 0.208***
(0.176) (0.0738) (0.0598) (0.173) (0.0725) (0.0581) (0.197) (0.0824) (0.0697)
year: 2008 1.669*** 0.870*** 0.239*** 1.645*** 0.862*** 0.223*** 1.469*** 0.776*** 0.249***
(0.176) (0.0766) (0.0613) (0.173) (0.0756) (0.0594) (0.195) (0.0884) (0.0700)
year: 2009 1.804*** 0.976*** 0.232*** 1.778*** 0.967*** 0.217*** 1.557*** 0.861*** 0.237***
(0.178) (0.0837) (0.0634) (0.174) (0.0822) (0.0614) (0.199) (0.0971) (0.0736)
year: 2010 2.024*** 1.088*** 0.268*** 1.979*** 1.072*** 0.244*** 1.780*** 0.992*** 0.259***
(0.176) (0.0765) (0.0650) (0.174) (0.0761) (0.0629) (0.199) (0.0882) (0.0765)
year: 2011 2.025*** 1.120*** 0.324*** 1.968*** 1.096*** 0.300*** 1.692*** 0.980*** 0.324***
(0.182) (0.0862) (0.0652) (0.182) (0.0853) (0.0632) (0.208) (0.102) (0.0766)
Constant -3.857* 1.324 -6.845*** 2.060 4.303*** -5.496*** -6.953*** -0.481 -5.820***
(1.996) (1.006) (0.752) (2.618) (1.340) (0.853) (2.224) (1.133) (0.903)
Observations 3,460 3,457 3,460 3,460 3,457 3,460 2,762 2,759 2,762
R-squared 0.457 0.612 0.737 0.487 0.633 0.755 0.417 0.523 0.637
Full sample Full sample, including HRR fixed effects Excluding rural hospitals
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
	Table 5: Price regressions
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
Ln (Hosp-HHI) 0.579*** 0.490*** 0.383*** 0.584*** 0.521*** 0.457***
(0.0342) (0.0499) (0.1110) (0.0351) (0.0499) (0.122)
Ln (Hosp-HHI) x For-profit -0.218*** -0.105 0.00514 -0.163*** -0.0491 0.0105
(0.0569) (0.0649) (0.0103) (0.0553) (0.0639) (0.00958)
Ln (Hosp-HHI) x Government -0.103 -0.272*** -0.0294** -0.121* -0.269*** -0.0326**
(0.0665) (0.0715) (0.0136) (0.0697) (0.0736) (0.0157)
For-profit 1.765*** 0.872* 1.329*** 0.438
(0.4650) (0.5260) (0.453) (0.518)
Government 0.681 2.090*** 0.825 2.046***
(0.5540) (0.5940) (0.581) (0.614)
Teaching hospital 0.528*** 0.479*** 0.419*** 0.386***
(0.0285) (0.0279) (0.0288) (0.0287)
Rural hospital -0.0665** -0.0727** -0.0377 -0.0376
(0.0311) (0.0309) (0.0289) (0.0284)
Ln (HSA population) 0.0311*** 0.0467*** 0.0252*** 0.0347***
(0.0097) (0.0097) (0.00882) (0.00922)
HSA: Median income 0.0536* 0.0171 0.0943*** 0.0676**
(0.0319) (0.0331) (0.0317) (0.0337)
HSA: % Uninsured -0.643 -2.009** -0.115 -0.847
(0.7570) (0.8430) (0.765) (0.844)
HSA: % Privately insured 0.646*** 0.432*** 0.490*** 0.261**
(0.1250) (0.1250) (0.122) (0.125)
year: 2002 0.140*** 0.138*** 0.131*** 0.158*** 0.159*** 0.152***
(0.0421) (0.0407) (0.0318) (0.0396) (0.0383) (0.0322)
year: 2003 0.258*** 0.253*** 0.236*** 0.285*** 0.282*** 0.270***
(0.0398) (0.0383) (0.0297) (0.0378) (0.0365) (0.0299)
year: 2004 0.445*** 0.436*** 0.402*** 0.454*** 0.446*** 0.426***
(0.0384) (0.0369) (0.0289) (0.0365) (0.0352) (0.0296)
year: 2005 0.484*** 0.479*** 0.439*** 0.487*** 0.482*** 0.458***
(0.0395) (0.0377) (0.0292) (0.0373) (0.0358) (0.0298)
year: 2006 0.536*** 0.533*** 0.498*** 0.534*** 0.530*** 0.512***
(0.0398) (0.0379) (0.0293) (0.0375) (0.0358) (0.0290)
year: 2007 0.656*** 0.652*** 0.613*** 0.510*** 0.506*** 0.485***
(0.0391) (0.0369) (0.0296) (0.0371) (0.0351) (0.0300)
year: 2008 0.682*** 0.679*** 0.641*** 0.648*** 0.645*** 0.628***
(0.0396) (0.0375) (0.0295) (0.0413) (0.0393) (0.0330)
year: 2009 0.768*** 0.764*** 0.724*** 0.683*** 0.679*** 0.661***
(0.0404) (0.0380) (0.0306) (0.0418) (0.0397) (0.0329)
year: 2010 0.828*** 0.822*** 0.766*** 0.768*** 0.760*** 0.732***
(0.0403) (0.0382) (0.0314) (0.0415) (0.0397) (0.0330)
year: 2011 0.877*** 0.870*** 0.809*** 0.837*** 0.828*** 0.796***
(0.0402) (0.0382) (0.0321) (0.0403) (0.0386) (0.0332)
Constant 2.723*** 3.772*** 5.548*** 2.541*** 3.331*** 5.106***
(0.4520) (0.5360) (0.9080) (0.464) (0.543) (1.005)
Observations 3,449 3,449 3,494 3,422 3,422 3,467
R-squared 0.359 0.442 0.733 0.327 0.403 0.678
HRR Fixed Effects YES YES
Hospital Fixed Effects YES YES
Ln(Price per DRG unit) Ln(Top DRG price index)
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 6: Summary statistics for unprofitable service offerings 
  
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
ER 84.5% 36.2% 73.5% 44.2% 88.5% 32.0%
Trauma 16.7% 37.3% 5.3% 22.3% 13.9% 34.6%
Psychiatric 25.0% 43.3% 25.8% 43.8% 29.2% 45.5%
OB 71.5% 45.1% 57.3% 49.5% 59.1% 49.2%
Burn ICU 3.5% 18.4% 1.8% 13.4% 4.7% 21.1%
Nonprofit For profit Government
Service
Table 7: Probit regressions for unprofitable service offerings with HRR fixed effects 
	
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Variables ER Trauma Psychiatric OB Burn ICU
Ln (Hosp-HHI) 0.496 0.213 0.877** 1.677*** -0.293
(0.848) (0.637) (0.362) (0.455) (0.665)
Ln (Hosp-HHI) x For-profit 0.395 1.441 -0.0361 0.0208 0.891
(0.640) (1.000) (0.565) (0.582) (0.877)
Ln (Hosp-HHI) x Government 0.216 0.384 -0.362 0.562 -0.225
(1.234) (0.858) (0.536) (0.663) (0.622)
For-profit -3.845 -12.21 0.0933 -0.608 -7.270
(5.022) (8.133) (4.524) (4.569) (6.900)
Government -1.322 -2.866 3.488 -4.580 2.285
(10.48) (7.142) (4.388) (5.472) (4.999)
Teaching hospital 1.205*** 2.026*** 1.493*** 0.373 0.941*
(0.461) (0.428) (0.282) (0.253) (0.515)
Rural hospital -0.249 -2.057*** -0.857**
(0.399) (0.375) (0.393)
Case Mix Index 0.277 0.592** -2.196*** -0.297 0.491**
(0.314) (0.258) (0.351) (0.216) (0.220)
Ln (HSA population) -0.318** 0.421*** 0.214** 0.126 0.0819
(0.126) (0.138) (0.0963) (0.101) (0.137)
HSA: Median income 0.480** -0.264 -0.133 0.127 -0.898
(0.242) (0.436) (0.226) (0.354) (0.925)
HSA: % Uninsured -0.829 11.72 -14.16** -2.662 -2.829
(8.079) (11.19) (5.647) (7.090) (11.61)
HSA: % Privately insured -3.691*** 3.410** 1.294 -0.462 3.160
(1.350) (1.373) (0.979) (1.289) (1.946)
year: 2002 12.53*** 6.646*** 6.911*** 11.57*** 5.068***
(0.593) (0.457) (0.217) (0.437) (0.357)
year: 2003 12.58*** 6.718*** 6.977*** 11.52*** 5.096***
(0.602) (0.444) (0.221) (0.436) (0.371)
year: 2004 12.35*** 6.745*** 7.022*** 11.50*** 5.062***
(0.556) (0.457) (0.228) (0.432) (0.374)
year: 2005 12.38*** 6.779*** 7.020*** 11.54*** 5.099***
(0.554) (0.474) (0.228) (0.438) (0.380)
year: 2006 12.66*** 6.790*** 7.001*** 11.56*** 5.106***
(0.559) (0.461) (0.246) (0.436) (0.376)
year: 2007 12.66*** 6.815*** 7.076*** 11.55*** 5.072***
(0.571) (0.473) (0.226) (0.439) (0.382)
year: 2008 12.55*** 6.809*** 7.171*** 11.58*** 5.068***
(0.610) (0.454) (0.228) (0.435) (0.369)
year: 2009 12.51*** 6.815*** 7.119*** 11.58*** 5.091***
(0.610) (0.444) (0.239) (0.433) (0.367)
year: 2010 12.57*** 6.876*** 7.236*** 11.56*** 5.272***
(0.577) (0.475) (0.260) (0.440) (0.375)
year: 2011 12.48*** 6.893*** 7.344*** 11.56*** 5.209***
(0.554) (0.511) (0.279) (0.438) (0.405)
Constant -14.60* -14.18* -13.04*** -26.23*** 2.761
(8.107) (7.433) (3.617) (6.464) (12.75)
Observations 3,450 2,498 3,118 3,450 2,004
Notes: Specifications include HRR fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Table 8: Full covariates results, (Hosp-HHI based on all patients; hospitals in top and bottom 25% of change 
in Hosp-HHI) 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Charity care Uncomp. care Charity volume Charity care Uncomp. care Charity volume Charity care Uncomp. care Charity volume
Ln (Hosp-HHI) -0.0212 -0.202** 0.448*** -0.504 -0.507*** 0.335*** 0.162 -0.101 0.401***
(0.170) (0.0804) (0.0706) (0.328) (0.144) (0.118) (0.190) (0.0868) (0.0874)
Ln (Hosp-HHI) x For-profit 0.258 0.642*** 0.307** 0.0169 0.641*** 0.181 0.212 0.571*** 0.399***
(0.372) (0.155) (0.125) (0.441) (0.149) (0.138) (0.432) (0.131) (0.150)
Ln (Hosp-HHI) x Government 2.788*** 0.770*** -1.125*** 2.806*** 1.004*** -1.057*** 8.750*** 2.759*** -1.685***
(0.563) (0.246) (0.128) (0.613) (0.261) (0.142) (0.673) (0.412) (0.214)
For-profit -2.554 -5.352*** -2.659** -0.528 -5.296*** -1.672 -1.770 -4.590*** -3.370***
(3.043) (1.256) (1.038) (3.579) (1.206) (1.144) (3.520) (1.075) (1.232)
Government -24.83*** -6.788*** 9.555*** -25.14*** -8.786*** 8.905*** -74.99*** -23.47*** 14.39***
(4.750) (2.094) (1.074) (5.151) (2.204) (1.187) (5.592) (3.480) (1.791)
Teaching hospital -1.282*** -0.473** 0.857*** -1.255*** -0.426* 1.154*** 0.102 -0.0425 0.717***
(0.325) (0.208) (0.108) (0.334) (0.223) (0.0791) (0.241) (0.175) (0.128)
Ln (Total discharges) 1.584*** 1.033*** 1.149*** 1.603*** 1.018*** 1.182*** 1.957*** 1.229*** 1.155***
(0.0738) (0.0400) (0.0217) (0.0743) (0.0470) (0.0249) (0.0813) (0.0550) (0.0300)
Rural hospital 0.841*** 0.259*** -0.0521 1.076*** 0.276*** -0.164***
(0.188) (0.0793) (0.0480) (0.205) (0.0904) (0.0538)
Ln (HSA population) -0.100 -0.0510 -0.104*** -0.206*** -0.101*** -0.135*** -0.289*** -0.154*** -0.131***
(0.0682) (0.0320) (0.0197) (0.0698) (0.0349) (0.0206) (0.0782) (0.0342) (0.0269)
HSA: Median income -0.258 -0.445*** 0.0997 -0.736** -0.568*** 0.346*** 0.270 -0.291** 0.162*
(0.223) (0.128) (0.0825) (0.297) (0.208) (0.0934) (0.227) (0.138) (0.0960)
HSA: % Uninsured 10.13** 8.141*** 15.77*** 13.50** 7.697*** 19.89*** 21.08*** 11.86*** 18.96***
(4.714) (2.562) (1.604) (5.493) (2.739) (1.569) (5.502) (3.365) (2.393)
HSA: % Privately insured 0.618 1.742*** -0.577** 0.305 1.461*** -0.391 -0.499 1.164*** -0.457
(0.802) (0.348) (0.273) (0.913) (0.466) (0.293) (0.780) (0.329) (0.313)
year: 2002 -0.0916 -0.0214 0.0686 -0.0977 -0.0258 0.0726 -0.0543 -0.0282 0.0693
(0.260) (0.116) (0.0797) (0.257) (0.113) (0.0733) (0.294) (0.140) (0.0945)
year: 2003 0.127 0.152 0.110 0.116 0.151 0.112 0.207 0.119 0.0933
(0.255) (0.112) (0.0821) (0.252) (0.109) (0.0761) (0.284) (0.134) (0.0972)
year: 2004 0.341 0.366*** 0.0940 0.324 0.368*** 0.0857 0.274 0.344** 0.0579
(0.264) (0.113) (0.0897) (0.260) (0.112) (0.0837) (0.295) (0.134) (0.109)
year: 2005 0.767*** 0.527*** 0.133 0.731*** 0.519*** 0.113 0.724*** 0.506*** 0.126
(0.251) (0.0950) (0.0825) (0.245) (0.0924) (0.0756) (0.272) (0.108) (0.0979)
year: 2006 1.150*** 0.647*** 0.217*** 1.116*** 0.642*** 0.199*** 1.134*** 0.628*** 0.207**
(0.236) (0.104) (0.0811) (0.231) (0.101) (0.0741) (0.256) (0.111) (0.0969)
year: 2007 1.334*** 0.753*** 0.203*** 1.302*** 0.753*** 0.179*** 1.315*** 0.729*** 0.199**
(0.234) (0.0999) (0.0772) (0.230) (0.0988) (0.0690) (0.251) (0.110) (0.0934)
year: 2008 1.632*** 0.842*** 0.238*** 1.591*** 0.839*** 0.211*** 1.590*** 0.737*** 0.254***
(0.234) (0.110) (0.0812) (0.232) (0.110) (0.0731) (0.250) (0.133) (0.0926)
year: 2009 1.705*** 0.955*** 0.224*** 1.673*** 0.952*** 0.201*** 1.573*** 0.840*** 0.233**
(0.235) (0.109) (0.0815) (0.232) (0.110) (0.0727) (0.253) (0.127) (0.0949)
year: 2010 1.733*** 1.034*** 0.284*** 1.683*** 1.024*** 0.256*** 1.541*** 0.904*** 0.269***
(0.237) (0.110) (0.0802) (0.236) (0.112) (0.0729) (0.261) (0.130) (0.0958)
year: 2011 1.704*** 1.110*** 0.333*** 1.646*** 1.094*** 0.310*** 1.411*** 0.945*** 0.317***
(0.249) (0.116) (0.0852) (0.249) (0.121) (0.0782) (0.278) (0.140) (0.102)
Constant -3.204 5.960*** -8.454*** 6.913 10.60*** -10.21*** -11.46*** 3.043 -8.629***
(3.062) (1.837) (1.096) (4.291) (2.781) (1.353) (3.330) (2.021) (1.385)
Observations 1,751 1,749 1,751 1,751 1,749 1,751 1,335 1,333 1,335
R-squared 0.530 0.666 0.808 0.560 0.687 0.844 0.537 0.599 0.718
Full sample Full sample, including HRR fixed effects Excluding rural hospitals
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Table 9: Price regressions (Hosp-HHI based on all patients; hospitals in top and bottom 25% of change in 
Hosp-HHI) 
	
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
Ln (Hosp-HHI) 0.559*** 0.457*** 0.418*** 0.548*** 0.518*** 0.592***
(0.0455) (0.0762) (0.126) (0.0470) (0.0760) (0.134)
Ln (Hosp-HHI) x For-profit -0.233*** -0.165* 0.00698 -0.182** -0.119 -0.00839
(0.0756) (0.0929) (0.0154) (0.0753) (0.0934) (0.0147)
Ln (Hosp-HHI) x Government -0.192** -0.286*** -0.0342 -0.195** -0.350*** -0.0583**
(0.0897) (0.0993) (0.0242) (0.0905) (0.0984) (0.0292)
For-profit 1.933*** 1.386* 1.534** 1.049
(0.625) (0.760) (0.623) (0.764)
Government 1.408* 2.192*** 1.462* 2.745***
(0.742) (0.825) (0.752) (0.820)
Teaching hospital 0.558*** 0.517*** 0.451*** 0.404***
(0.0459) (0.0483) (0.0470) (0.0480)
Rural hospital -0.0314 -0.0468 0.0222 -0.00959
(0.0436) (0.0414) (0.0366) (0.0346)
Ln (HSA population) 0.0365** 0.0468*** 0.0405*** 0.0438***
(0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0129) (0.0143)
HSA: Median income 0.118** 0.0937* 0.162*** 0.179***
(0.0490) (0.0561) (0.0494) (0.0561)
HSA: % Uninsured -1.226 -3.697*** -0.257 -1.661
(0.968) (1.054) (1.017) (1.113)
HSA: % Privately insured 0.596*** 0.0909 0.500*** -0.0909
(0.179) (0.183) (0.177) (0.181)
year: 2002 0.153** 0.148*** 0.140*** 0.168*** 0.161*** 0.155***
(0.0594) (0.0571) (0.0437) (0.0542) (0.0513) (0.0421)
year: 2003 0.230*** 0.226*** 0.214*** 0.245*** 0.239*** 0.229***
(0.0568) (0.0544) (0.0420) (0.0544) (0.0513) (0.0406)
year: 2004 0.418*** 0.411*** 0.376*** 0.416*** 0.401*** 0.387***
(0.0537) (0.0514) (0.0412) (0.0515) (0.0486) (0.0405)
year: 2005 0.434*** 0.430*** 0.389*** 0.467*** 0.456*** 0.436***
(0.0568) (0.0536) (0.0417) (0.0534) (0.0504) (0.0414)
year: 2006 0.477*** 0.470*** 0.440*** 0.488*** 0.475*** 0.466***
(0.0564) (0.0524) (0.0403) (0.0539) (0.0501) (0.0394)
year: 2007 0.607*** 0.602*** 0.567*** 0.459*** 0.447*** 0.436***
(0.0558) (0.0514) (0.0405) (0.0530) (0.0486) (0.0406)
year: 2008 0.620*** 0.615*** 0.581*** 0.573*** 0.561*** 0.555***
(0.0563) (0.0523) (0.0415) (0.0611) (0.0564) (0.0480)
year: 2009 0.717*** 0.710*** 0.677*** 0.598*** 0.582*** 0.578***
(0.0564) (0.0530) (0.0442) (0.0598) (0.0559) (0.0467)
year: 2010 0.770*** 0.760*** 0.704*** 0.711*** 0.689*** 0.671***
(0.0564) (0.0536) (0.0450) (0.0601) (0.0573) (0.0463)
year: 2011 0.813*** 0.795*** 0.734*** 0.771*** 0.742*** 0.717***
(0.0580) (0.0555) (0.0466) (0.0594) (0.0566) (0.0470)
Constant 2.170*** 3.404*** 5.268*** 1.935*** 2.212** 4.098***
(0.697) (0.902) (1.032) (0.720) (0.904) (1.106)
Observations 1,741 1,741 1,763 1,718 1,718 1,740
R-squared 0.330 0.449 0.718 0.285 0.406 0.668
HRR Fixed Effects YES YES
Hospital Fixed Effects YES YES
Ln(Price per DRG unit) Ln(Top DRG price index)
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 10: Common DRGs used to construct the price index 
 
	
DRG MDC Category Description
88 4 M Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease
89 4 M Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy Age >17 w cc
97 4 M Bronchitis & Asthma Age >17 w/o cc
127 5 M Heart Failure & Shock
138 5 M Cardiac Arrhythmia & Conduction Disorders w cc
ta 5 M Cardiac Arrhythmia & Conduction Disorders w/o cc
143 5 M Chest Pain
167 6 P Appendectomy w/o Complicated Principal Diagnoses w/o cc
174 6 M Gastrointestinal Hemorrhage w cc
182 6 M Esophagitis, Gastroenteritis & Misc Digest Disorders Age >17 w cc
183 6 M Esophagitis, Gastroenteritis/Misc Digest Disorders Age >17 w/o cc
204 7 M Disorders of  Pancreas except Malignancy
294 10 M Diabetes Age >35
296 10 M Nutritional & Misc Metabolic Disorders Age >17 w cc
320 11 M Kidney & Urinary Tract Infections Age >17 w cc
359 13 P Uterine & Adnexa Proc for Non-Malignancy w/o cc
416 18 M Septicemia Age >17
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Appendix A:  
Welfare analysis for the case of  linear demand curves  
We now present an example to illustrate how a merger of nonprofit hospitals can increase social welfare by 
suppressing competition. Following our analysis above, suppose that a hospital monopolist produces a 
single service at a total cost of ( )c q F cq= + , and that it is able to divide the aggregate demand into two 
groups: rich patients (Market 1) and poor patients (Market 2). These two groups have two distinct 
downward-sloping demand curves for hospital services, the demand curves are known to the monopolist, 
and there is no opportunity for arbitrage between groups, as medical care is “non-tradable” from the 
patient prospective. To illustrate our point simply, we assume that under uniform pricing Market 2 is not 
served profitably when price is set at marginal cost. This is important for our example because when 
demand curves are linear, price discrimination results in lower welfare and uniform price is favored 
(Schmalensee, 1981). In our model however, since the poor are excluded under a uniform price, the 
welfare implications of price discrimination are ambiguous.  
The monopolist chooses a price for each group. Let { }1 2,P P denote the prices in Market 1 and Market 2 
respectively. Assume that the demand curve in Market i is i i i iq a b P= − . Serving Market i is profitable if 
iP c> , or i ia c b> ⋅  for 1,2i = . If this condition is violated a for-profit monopoly will not engage in price 
discrimination. Instead, it will choose a uniform price (i.e. set price in both markets equal to the monopoly 
price for rich patients). Such pricing behavior excludes poor patients from receiving services. On the other 
hand, a nonprofit monopoly may serve markets in which this condition is violated. By relying on other 
segments of the population for whom they can price above cost (Market 1), the nonprofit firm will price 
below cost in Market 2 without violating its non-distribution constraint, which applies to the organization 
as a whole.  
Under the assumption that 2 2 0cb a− >  a for-profit monopoly will always choose to exclude the poor 
( 2 0
Fq = ). On the other hand, a sufficient condition for a nonprofit monopoly to serve the poor is the 
ability to set 1P  above c . The monopoly will supply services to the poor even in the extreme case, where 
the social value of serving the poor (for every level of quantity) is lower than the social cost. As previously 
discussed, under these conditions, poor patients are served only if the hospital is nonprofit. However, this 
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does not imply that, for example, merger to monopoly will necessarily increase welfare. The change in 
welfare across groups is given by:  
12
1
2 10
[ ( ) ] ( )
M M
D
q P
P
W P x c dx q x dxα⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤Δ = + − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫ ∫  
The first term is the surplus generated in Market 2 as a result of such merger to monopoly and the second 
term is the loss of consumer surplus in Market 1. As expected the desirability of merger (i.e. suppression 
of competition) increases with α , the additional value that society places on each unit of the poor's 
consumption. While the nonprofit monopolist does not consider α  when choosing the quantity of 
services to the poor, a greater α  will increase the social benefits from eliminating competition. 
Subsequently this would raise the attractiveness of 501(c)(3) organizations as a vehicle for achieving social 
goals.  
Following Proposition 2, the price for paying consumers chosen by the monopolist (problem (1)) is given 
by 1 11
12
M a c bP
b
+ ⋅
=
⋅
, whereas, the price chosen by the social planner (problem (2)) is given by 
* 1 1
1
1
(1 )
(1 2 )
a c b
P
b
λ λ
λ
⋅ + + ⋅ ⋅
=
+ ⋅
. The profit condition 1 1a c b> ⋅  is necessary and sufficient for 
*
1 1
MP P> .1 Hence, 
as in the general case, the altruistic nonprofit monopolist overprices healthcare to the rich and over-
provides services to the poor.  
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Appendix B1: Cross-sectional and fixed effects results, log-log specifications (Hosp-HHI based on Medicare patients only) 
  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Charity Care Uncomp. Care Charity Volume Charity Care Uncomp. Care Charity Volume Charity Care Uncomp. Care Charity Volume
0.737*** 0.264*** 0.250*** 0.291** 0.0350 0.358*** 0.294** 0.104* 0.519***
(0.131) (0.0551) (0.0450) (0.122) (0.0564) (0.0552) (0.127) (0.0598) (0.0540)
-0.324 0.301** 0.223* -0.302 0.276** 0.209*
(0.318) (0.137) (0.115) (0.321) (0.139) (0.111)
3.436*** 0.970*** -1.074*** 3.434*** 0.874*** -1.294***
(0.514) (0.223) (0.115) (0.520) (0.231) (0.110)
3,488 3,485 3,488 3,488 3,485 3,488 3,488 3,485 3,488
0.424 0.601 0.703 0.443 0.606 0.711 0.443 0.608 0.723
-0.466 -0.542*** 0.131 -0.579 -0.546*** 0.102 -0.559 -0.548*** 0.0193
(0.618) (0.190) (0.203) (0.674) (0.195) (0.204) (0.644) (0.186) (0.169)
0.0662 -0.00893 0.0222 0.0651* -0.00884 0.0266
(0.0391) (0.0105) (0.0164) (0.0374) (0.00963) (0.0184)
0.0976 0.0267 0.0132 0.0984 0.0267 0.00973
(0.120) (0.0347) (0.0181) (0.121) (0.0345) (0.0150)
3,488 3,485 3,488 3,488 3,485 3,488 3,488 3,485 3,488
0.792 0.839 0.927 0.793 0.839 0.927 0.793 0.839 0.933
Ln(Hosp-HHI)
Cross-Sectional
Ln(Hosp-HHI)
Ln(Hosp-HHI) * For-Profit
R-squared
[A] Specification also includes year dummies, For-profit and Government hospital dummies, Ln(Total Discharges)
[B] Specification also includes year dummies, For-profit and Government hospital dummies, Ln(Total Discharges), HSA % Privately insured, HSA % Self-pay
Ln(Hosp-HHI) * For-Profit
Ln(Hosp-HHI) *Government
Observations
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Errors in the hospital fixed-effect models are clustered on HRR.
Ownership interactions [A] Payer mix controls [B]
Hospital Fixed-Effects
No ownership interactions[A]
Ln(Hosp-HHI) *Government
Observations
R-squared
Appendix B2: Full covariates results, log-log specification (Hosp-HHI based on Medicare patients only)	
 
 
 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Charity care Uncomp. care Charity volume Charity care Uncomp. care Charity volume Charity care Uncomp. care Charity volume
Ln (Hosp-HHI) 0.0980 0.0386 0.524*** -0.206 -0.0849 0.261*** 0.205 0.122* 0.388***
(0.145) (0.0639) (0.0595) (0.223) (0.102) (0.0858) (0.159) (0.0708) (0.0680)
Ln (Hosp-HHI) x For-profit -0.527 0.191 0.154 -0.652* 0.185 0.323** -0.547 0.134 0.274**
(0.321) (0.140) (0.114) (0.342) (0.135) (0.125) (0.350) (0.130) (0.132)
Ln (Hosp-HHI) x Government 3.514*** 0.957*** -1.069*** 3.283*** 0.934*** -1.040*** 7.304*** 2.180*** -1.472***
(0.508) (0.211) (0.108) (0.572) (0.230) (0.121) (0.619) (0.287) (0.144)
For-profit 3.941 -1.599 -1.402 4.981* -1.528 -2.801*** 4.346 -0.996 -2.421**
(2.652) (1.150) (0.954) (2.820) (1.115) (1.040) (2.889) (1.072) (1.093)
Government -31.36*** -8.394*** 9.505*** -29.45*** -8.210*** 9.342*** -64.06*** -18.90*** 13.20***
(4.361) (1.818) (0.922) (4.894) (1.963) (1.032) (5.310) (2.475) (1.229)
Teaching hospital 0.0879 0.147 0.611*** -0.204 0.0406 0.578*** 0.828*** 0.337*** 0.493***
(0.183) (0.108) (0.0672) (0.186) (0.116) (0.0681) (0.162) (0.0943) (0.0752)
Ln (Total discharges) 1.514*** 1.028*** 1.066*** 1.574*** 1.025*** 1.075*** 1.776*** 1.188*** 1.010***
(0.0569) (0.0305) (0.0219) (0.0579) (0.0348) (0.0243) (0.0628) (0.0391) (0.0295)
Rural hospital 0.755*** 0.261*** -0.206*** 0.886*** 0.265*** -0.264***
(0.140) (0.0616) (0.0444) (0.146) (0.0633) (0.0464)  
Ln (HSA population) -0.118** -0.0490** -0.0711*** -0.227*** -0.0875*** -0.0673*** -0.257*** -0.109*** -0.0801***
(0.0497) (0.0219) (0.0177) (0.0525) (0.0233) (0.0182) (0.0537) (0.0237) (0.0214)
HSA: Median income -0.430*** -0.236*** -0.191*** -0.727*** -0.389*** -0.201*** -0.367** -0.209*** -0.159**
(0.160) (0.0661) (0.0565) (0.187) (0.0894) (0.0613) (0.168) (0.0708) (0.0618)
HSA: % Uninsured -0.243 7.026*** 12.55*** 6.267 8.361*** 17.21*** 6.638 8.158*** 14.17***
(3.525) (1.840) (1.250) (3.881) (1.887) (1.436) (4.534) (2.520) (1.733)
HSA: % Privately insured 1.556** 1.053*** 0.153 1.167* 0.783*** 0.277 1.085* 0.634*** 0.253
(0.609) (0.235) (0.214) (0.649) (0.251) (0.234) (0.648) (0.242) (0.249)
year: 2002 0.0437 0.103 0.0408 0.0358 0.102 0.0392 -0.0105 0.0713 0.0510
(0.189) (0.0767) (0.0629) (0.187) (0.0758) (0.0601) (0.214) (0.0884) (0.0724)
year: 2003 0.305 0.253*** 0.0698 0.284 0.245*** 0.0686 0.243 0.198** 0.0634
(0.188) (0.0792) (0.0651) (0.185) (0.0778) (0.0627) (0.209) (0.0920) (0.0754)
year: 2004 0.552*** 0.433*** 0.0778 0.535*** 0.427*** 0.0722 0.426** 0.386*** 0.0676
(0.189) (0.0807) (0.0679) (0.186) (0.0801) (0.0656) (0.213) (0.0943) (0.0799)
year: 2005 0.884*** 0.544*** 0.122* 0.850*** 0.533*** 0.111* 0.713*** 0.488*** 0.121
(0.185) (0.0729) (0.0649) (0.182) (0.0718) (0.0632) (0.206) (0.0836) (0.0754)
year: 2006 1.207*** 0.669*** 0.187*** 1.178*** 0.662*** 0.174*** 1.049*** 0.610*** 0.188***
(0.181) (0.0734) (0.0625) (0.178) (0.0719) (0.0605) (0.204) (0.0807) (0.0723)
year: 2007 1.489*** 0.790*** 0.209*** 1.451*** 0.781*** 0.189*** 1.283*** 0.720*** 0.219***
(0.177) (0.0746) (0.0603) (0.175) (0.0732) (0.0584) (0.199) (0.0837) (0.0701)
year: 2008 1.701*** 0.886*** 0.242*** 1.660*** 0.876*** 0.224*** 1.474*** 0.778*** 0.258***
(0.177) (0.0771) (0.0618) (0.174) (0.0761) (0.0598) (0.198) (0.0896) (0.0705)
year: 2009 1.839*** 0.991*** 0.234*** 1.803*** 0.981*** 0.219*** 1.566*** 0.863*** 0.246***
(0.178) (0.0843) (0.0641) (0.175) (0.0826) (0.0619) (0.201) (0.0978) (0.0742)
year: 2010 2.060*** 1.107*** 0.273*** 2.000*** 1.087*** 0.247*** 1.787*** 0.993*** 0.270***
(0.178) (0.0776) (0.0658) (0.177) (0.0770) (0.0636) (0.203) (0.0897) (0.0772)
year: 2011 2.076*** 1.138*** 0.322*** 2.006*** 1.112*** 0.296*** 1.712*** 0.983*** 0.328***
(0.184) (0.0872) (0.0661) (0.184) (0.0861) (0.0640) (0.211) (0.103) (0.0774)
Constant -1.969 1.809* -5.886*** 4.496* 5.029*** -3.876*** -4.116* 0.269 -4.583***
(2.040) (1.024) (0.791) (2.574) (1.311) (0.887) (2.274) (1.151) (0.926)
Observations 3,443 3,440 3,443 3,443 3,440 3,443 2,749 2,746 2,749
R-squared 0.457 0.612 0.732 0.486 0.632 0.752 0.414 0.521 0.629
Full sample Full sample, including HRR fixed effects Excluding rural hospitals
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.
Appendix B3: Price regressions, (Hosp-HHI based on Medicare patients only) 
 
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
Ln (Hosp-HHI) 0.640*** 0.543*** 0.426*** 0.649*** 0.568*** 0.415***
(0.0375) (0.0498) (0.102) (0.0385) (0.0501) (0.113)
Ln (Hosp-HHI) x For-profit -0.236*** -0.107 0.00353 -0.180*** -0.0527 0.00876
(0.0617) (0.0684) (0.0101) (0.0598) (0.0669) (0.00937)
Ln (Hosp-HHI) x Government -0.0626 -0.255*** -0.0297** -0.144* -0.326*** -0.0333**
(0.0763) (0.0757) (0.0131) (0.0765) (0.0760) (0.0149)
For-profit 1.973*** 0.929 1.521*** 0.498
(0.516) (0.569) (0.500) (0.555)
Government 0.358 1.996*** 1.044 2.569***
(0.651) (0.645) (0.650) (0.647)
Teaching hospital 0.565*** 0.498*** 0.450*** 0.397***
(0.0288) (0.0287) (0.0286) (0.0290)
Rural hospital -0.0362 -0.0565* -0.0128 -0.0271
(0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0291) (0.0286)
Ln (HSA population) 0.0419*** 0.0556*** 0.0342*** 0.0421***
(0.00950) (0.00965) (0.00896) (0.00934)
HSA: Median income 0.0318 -0.00203 0.0661** 0.0418
(0.0325) (0.0336) (0.0324) (0.0344)
HSA: % Uninsured -1.483** -2.372*** -0.915 -1.173
(0.752) (0.838) (0.764) (0.837)
HSA: % Privately insured 0.428*** 0.320** 0.282** 0.156
(0.127) (0.126) (0.125) (0.128)
year: 2002 0.143*** 0.144*** 0.130*** 0.163*** 0.166*** 0.154***
(0.0424) (0.0408) (0.0319) (0.0399) (0.0385) (0.0326)
year: 2003 0.255*** 0.252*** 0.231*** 0.282*** 0.281*** 0.266***
(0.0400) (0.0385) (0.0299) (0.0380) (0.0367) (0.0301)
year: 2004 0.439*** 0.435*** 0.397*** 0.449*** 0.445*** 0.423***
(0.0387) (0.0372) (0.0290) (0.0367) (0.0354) (0.0298)
year: 2005 0.478*** 0.476*** 0.432*** 0.482*** 0.478*** 0.453***
(0.0396) (0.0378) (0.0293) (0.0376) (0.0359) (0.0301)
year: 2006 0.531*** 0.531*** 0.492*** 0.528*** 0.526*** 0.506***
(0.0401) (0.0381) (0.0294) (0.0377) (0.0359) (0.0293)
year: 2007 0.652*** 0.650*** 0.607*** 0.507*** 0.505*** 0.481***
(0.0393) (0.0371) (0.0297) (0.0374) (0.0354) (0.0303)
year: 2008 0.679*** 0.679*** 0.635*** 0.646*** 0.644*** 0.623***
(0.0399) (0.0378) (0.0297) (0.0416) (0.0397) (0.0335)
year: 2009 0.762*** 0.761*** 0.719*** 0.679*** 0.677*** 0.657***
(0.0406) (0.0382) (0.0308) (0.0422) (0.0401) (0.0334)
year: 2010 0.824*** 0.822*** 0.764*** 0.767*** 0.762*** 0.732***
(0.0407) (0.0385) (0.0316) (0.0419) (0.0400) (0.0333)
year: 2011 0.870*** 0.866*** 0.804*** 0.833*** 0.826*** 0.794***
(0.0407) (0.0386) (0.0323) (0.0409) (0.0391) (0.0337)
Constant 2.299*** 3.380*** 5.132*** 2.169*** 3.076*** 5.388***
(0.467) (0.525) (0.850) (0.485) (0.541) (0.945)
Observations 3,433 3,433 3,478 3,407 3,407 3,452
R-squared 0.363 0.446 0.735 0.331 0.408 0.679
HRR Fixed Effects YES YES
Hospital Fixed Effects YES YES
Ln(Price per DRG unit) Ln(Top DRG price index)
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix C: Construction of price measures 
Both price measures analyzed in this paper are constructed using information on 
hospitals’ actual revenue from private payers as a percentage of their total list charges to 
private payers. The percentages are derived from the OSHPD financial disclosure reports, 
which provide gross and net inpatient revenue from third party payers, separately for 
“traditional” insurance products (i.e., fee-for-service plans) and managed care insurance 
products. Individual patient records in the hospital discharge data identify (1) the list 
charges associated with the visit, (2) the payer category (private, Medicare, Medicaid, 
etc.), and (3) whether the plan type is traditional or managed care. This facilitates 
matching the plan type discount factor to the patient's plan type. 
The steps in computing the two price measures are as follows. We first compute the 
hospital-level ratio of net revenue to gross revenue in each year, separately for private 
traditional products and private managed care products. We exclude data from Kaiser 
hospitals because they do not report financial data and generally do not treat non-Kaiser 
patients. For each type of products, we then clean the resulting ratios by bottom-capping 
them at annual 5th percentile, and top-capping them at annual 95th percentile of ratios 
across hospitals.  
We estimate the net payment to hospitals as the weighted average of charges by payer 
category and plan type. The charges are from the patient-level discharge data and we 
weight them using ratios obtained from the previous step. 
Finally, we construct two price measures: an overall severity-adjusted price, and a price 
index based on conditions (DRGs) treated at a broad set of hospitals. The severity-
adjusted price is computed as the ratio of the total net payment to the total DRG unitsc1 at 
hospital-year level. The price index is the within DRG net payment averaged across 
                                                 
c1 DRG units are the case weights attached to DRGs; these weights indicate the national average relative 
cost of care. For example, a patient in a DRG with a weight of 4 is twice as costly to treat on average as a 
patient in a DRG with a weight of 2. 
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hospitals. For the small number of hospital-years with some missing DRGs, we impute 
the missing index using the full sample averages.c2 
Table C1 lists the DRGs used in constructing the price index. As shown in Figure C1, the 
two price measures are highly correlated and have similar magnitudes. 
Table C1: Common DRGs used to construct the price index 
 
 
Figure C1: Scatter plot of the two price measures 
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c2 It would likely be possible to obtain a better price index by regressing each component price in the index 
on the other prices and the severity-adjusted price.  
Corr = .914 
